

The Myths and Realities of U.S. Peace Operations In the Late-20th Century

by

Colonel Michael W. Alvis, U.S. Army

Army Senior Fellow-Harvard
(Weatherhead Center for International Affairs)
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Phone: (703) 697-7311
Fax: (703) 695-6385
Email: michael.alvis@hqda.army.mil

The attached research project was prepared under the auspices of the Weatherhead Center Fellows Program and the U.S. Army Senior Fellowship Program. Upon clearance by the Public Affairs Office, Headquarters, Department of the Army, this paper will be released to the United States Institute of Peace for publication. It has been prepared in the format of the U.S. Institute of Peace Press.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

July 12, 1999

KEY POINTS

- Military peace operations—peacekeeping and peace enforcement—can be an effective tool in furthering U.S. national interests and coping with the dynamics of the international security environment. However, with a greatly reduced military (over one-third), these operations should be undertaken selectively and in consonance with our national security strategy, not place it at risk. Every mission has a cost and peace operations must be weighed and balanced in the grand scheme of national security.
- The decision to pursue a defense drawdown, rather than sustaining funding to achieve a Pax Americana, won out as the priority of the American people, after the Cold War, yielding \$750 billion in savings. America, however, inexplicably began undertaking peace operations without congressional budget authority, public mandate or formal policy, increasing missions 300 percent for the Army and 400 percent for the Air Force, leading to a readiness crisis.
- Asset preservation must be the watchword when contemplating the use of these reduced U.S. forces. Only the U.S. military can engage in the use of force on behalf of the American people and this capability must be protected at all costs. Peace operations should never be allowed to compromise current or future readiness, as was the case in the 1990s. When viewed holistically as part of an integrated national security strategy, these mistakes are less likely to repeat themselves.
- America has no choice but to take an “appetite suppressant” from the unbridled approach to peace and humanitarian operations of the past decade. There is a major disconnect between the resources that Americans are willing to commit to its Armed Forces and the appetite for a “values based” foreign and national security policy. At 2.9% GDP, it is impossible to pursue a strategy based on intervention in ethnic conflicts and humanitarian crises. Without a major increase in defense spending, the United States has no choice but to adopt a policy of “selective engagement” in the 21st Century.
- The American approach to peace operations is wrong. Rather than committing forces to causes that the American people find compelling—where the consequences sometimes are costly, but acceptable--the tendency today is to commit to causes of lesser importance that avoid the issue altogether by instructing the military to perform casualty free operations.
- The U.S. must be willing to accept casualties in peace operations. Military operations are inherently dangerous and the American people have historically shown that they are willing to accept casualties when they consider causes to be compelling. There is no reason to conclude that military personnel are immune to the normal dangers of military life, criminal behavior or terrorist attack because they are serving under a peacekeeping mandate. Rather than subordinate mission success to a higher priority of force protection, America should limit itself to those operations that the public supports and where certain costs are deemed acceptable vis a vis the benefits.

- Congressional approval can also lead to more aggressive and effective peace operations. Committing U.S. forces to peace operations without public and congressional support, as was the case in Bosnia, encourages a minimalist approach that places the responsibility and consequences for casualties and failure solely on the administration and the military. On the ground, commanders feel pressure to accept zero losses which jeopardizes the peace mission and unnecessarily prolongs operations.
- Peace operations need to be funded up front, as there is no surplus in the U.S. defense budget. Migrating funds from pay and quality of life programs impact negatively on recruiting and retention, delaying procurement of state-of-the-art weapons systems, which jeopardizes future readiness. If Congress—the representatives of the American people—isn't willing to commit funds for a particular peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission, then undertaking such a task should be rethought.
- Allowing active component readiness to suffer, just to utilize a more expensive reserve component is not viable in resource constrained environment. Additionally, overcommitting the reserves to solve operational tempo (OPTEMPO) problems is not fair and is having an impact on their own recruiting and retention. The best way to lower OPTEMPO is to limit the suite of potential situations where the U.S. military is called upon as the “agency of choice” solely because of its capabilities and history of success. Humanitarian operations should be left to humanitarian organizations.
- U.S. military personnel have always executed peace operations professionally-- as they perform all their missions--and, like most Americans, enjoy lending a helping hand to those in need. However, that does not mean that military professionals prefer spending a career on multiple deployments at the expense of a reasonable family life. While the military lifestyle is unique enough to compete favorably with the civilian sector, when faced with sustained financial hardships and extended time away from home, many married servicemen and women are feeling a greater responsibility to their families and are leaving the service.
- The United Nations is incapable—virtually by design—of commanding and controlling large and complex “second-generation” forces for peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Although Security Council resolutions remain helpful in building consensus and adding legitimacy to such efforts, such operations are best undertaken unilaterally or by “coalitions of the willing,” using selected countries within established military alliances, like NATO.

Introduction

The United States entered the 1990s on a roll, emerging from the Cold War as the globe's single remaining superpower. America led its allies to a decisive victory in the Gulf War, less than fourteen months into the decade, demonstrating competence and confidence in this new role. Vetoes of multilateral initiatives by permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, commonplace during the Cold War, became rare.¹ Once-adversarial Council members, such as China and Russia, responded favorably to U.S. leadership while engaging with America economically. Also, the reputation of the United Nations improved following peacekeeping successes in Namibia, Cambodia and El Salvador. With U.S. leadership and a cooperative Security Council, there appeared no limit to what could be achieved — in the interest of peace — as the world closed out the bloodiest century in its history.

Multilateral peace operations became more feasible, in the absence of the bipolar superpower stalemate, but regrettably, the United States did not have sufficient time to develop a peace operations doctrine before it was compelled into action.² Intrastate conflicts — resulting from the fall of communism and other dynamics — quickly overloaded the United Nations, defaulting the problem to the United States. For example, the situation with the Kurdish minority in Northern Iraq evolved immediately as a sequel to the Gulf War. Obligations inherited from the 1980s already tied up a U.S. combat battalion in the Sinai. It quickly became apparent that the United States was in the large unit peace operations business — policy or no policy.

Without a firm policy framework to provide guidelines for disciplined planning, U.S. military peace operations increased to an unprecedented level in the first half of the decade. By the end of 1995, six major peace operations had been undertaken, increasing missions 300 percent for

the Army and 400 percent for the Air Force.³ During the Cold War, the United States had participated in UN peacekeeping efforts by providing personnel fills -- small numbers of observers and monitors -- for larger multi-national organizations, but never large combat units. In non-UN sponsored peace operations, only one large unit — an infantry battalion — was committed in the Sinai as part of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), and its impact on the large Cold War military was minimal.

Department of Defense (DoD) leaders became willing participants during the period of increased demand for peace operations in the early 1990s. In the absence of a finite peace operations doctrine, there was virtually no basis for resisting and being able to substantiate their objections to administration foreign policy makers outside the Pentagon. With the Cold War military machine still largely intact after the Gulf War, no threatening Warsaw Pact, and Saddam Hussein firmly confined within his own borders, there were few competing priorities to justify foot-dragging on the part of the Department. Sufficient forces were in place to counter threats in such places as Korea, and the United States could forecast no military peer or near-peer for the next fifteen to twenty years.

There were other reasons that DoD accepted increased involvement in peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, military leaders had been looking for opportunities to redefine the role of the armed forces and adapt to the post-Cold War Era. Ivan Eland from the Cato Institute stated: “They don’t really like to do peacekeeping, but they know from an organizational point of view they have to do it to prove their relevance.”⁴ The need to prove relevance should not have been necessary, given America’s global responsibilities, but this concern among the Pentagon leadership was well founded. In the American tradition, a

dramatic drawdown in personnel and equipment immediately follows major victory, despite prophetic predictions of decreased readiness followed by disastrous results when new threats inevitably emerge down the road. Nevertheless, the Cold War was being hailed as such a major victory and American wanted its “peace dividend.”

The arrival of the Clinton administration and its expanded national security strategy focusing on “engagement and enlargement” legitimized the military’s role in nontraditional missions and increased its relevance in areas other than warfighting.⁵ Peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations empowered the armed forces, in the early stages of a conflict, to influence the situation, preempting an escalation of the conflict with it potentially greater human and monetary costs. Also, the possibility of preserving some units from the impending force structure cuts was not lost on military leaders, as the same forces that are used to perform peace operations are also used for the primary military mission: fighting and winning wars. Defense advocates, anxious to prevent conflict and preserve warfighting capability, initially viewed peace operations as a very positive opportunity. John Hillen stated that peace operations “may be the key to keeping an Army that has a robust end strength and big budget.”⁶

After almost a decade of discovery learning and evolving policy, America is now beginning to come to grips with its role as the world’s dominant major power and the place that peace operations plays in executing that role. What was viewed initially by America’s leaders principally as a positive opportunity to shape a better world and maintain relevance in the post-Cold War era, is now being viewed more comprehensively: in terms of its costs and restrictions. While Americans seem willing to expend over \$20 billion in Bosnia and billions more in Kosovo, they also like the idea of restricting defense spending below the 3% Domestic Product Gross (GDP) level. This contradiction has produced a frenetic operational tempo for the

severely reduced forces and declining readiness as a result of funds diversions from modernization and training account. Also, poor retention of career personnel as military pay increases and quality of life initiatives were slowed to free-up dollars for unfunded peace operations. The additional restriction resulting from the American public's perceived intolerance for casualties further complicates matters. As we enter the 21st Century, there are some myths that have evolved from America's "peacekeeping decade" that still linger today, influencing the debate and confusing policy. My aim in this essay is to outline and discuss five prevalent myths that have evolved from the 1990s experience and the realities of U.S. peace operations as we approach the millennium.

Myth #1: The Cold War is over and the task of the world' sole remaining superpower now turns to enforcing peace and ending violence throughout the world.

In the post-cold war era, secondary interests have a new salience in U.S. foreign policy. The United States has more freedom to gratify its wants now that its needs are largely satisfied.⁷

David Callahan

By being somewhat more ready to use force, and using it wisely and firmly when necessary, the United States and the international community may be able to significantly reduce the level of bloodshed around the world.⁸

Michael O'Hanlon

It (Kosovo) has become ground zero in the debate over whether America should play a new role in the world, that of the indispensable nation asserting its morality as well as its interests to assure stability, stop thugs and prevent human atrocities.⁹

Walter Isaacson

Reality: There is a major disconnect between the resources that America is willing to commit to its Armed Forces and the appetite among a vocal minority for a "values based" foreign and national security policy. At 2.9% GDP, it is impossible to pursue a strategy based on

intervention in ethnic conflicts and humanitarian crises.¹⁰ Such a commitment would wear out America “physically and psychologically,” according to Henry Kissinger, even if it were politically possible to abandon the Balanced Budget Agreement, increase defense spending and recruit and man a larger force for the 21st Century.¹¹ However, there is virtually no political support to increase defense spending to the level needed to prosecute such a wide range of commitments while modernizing, maintaining current readiness and addressing new threats (terrorism and ballistic missile defense) as outlined in the Administration’s most updated National Security Strategy of 1998.¹² Without a major increase in defense spending, the United States has no choice but to adopt a policy of “selective engagement” in the 21st Century. America will need to take an “appetite suppressant” from the unbridled approach to peace and humanitarian operations it was unable to resist in the 1990s.

Peacekeeping commitments may so degrade the armed forces’ war-fighting capabilities that it will be impossible to carry out the national strategy.¹³

Rep. Ike Skelton

We simply cannot carry out the missions that we have with the budget that we have: there is a mismatch. We have more to do and less to do it with, and it is starting to show in wear and tear: wear and tear on people; wear and tear on equipment.¹⁴

Defense Secretary Cohen

Too many unprogrammed deployments will inevitably disrupt operating budgets, sap morale, cause lost training opportunities, and accelerate wear and tear on equipment. Most importantly of all, uncontrolled operations tempo destroys quality of life and jeopardizes our ability to retain quality people.¹⁵

General Henry Shelton

Post-Cold War Choices. The United States had the option of transitioning its Cold War military to undertake new missions focused on pursuing secondary interests (Callahan) or ending violence (O’Hanlon); however, the nation opted instead for a “peace dividend” with an eye toward a balanced budget. The success of this plan depended on a reduction of expensive military force structure by about one-third, while at the same time, resisting any temptation to increase operating expenditures. The needed discipline was provided by the Congress, on the budgetary side, while the Administration also “capped” defense spending at levels commensurate with the goal of a balanced budget. Unfortunately this discipline didn’t carry over to the foreign policy arena. Callahan explains:

It would be wrong to characterize current foreign policy as idealistic overall, but it is clearly more idealistic today than it was during the cold war. The large-scale humanitarian missions to northern Iraq and Somalia, for example, have no precedent in cold war history.¹⁶

While the Congress was successful in maintaining the needed focus through the funds appropriation process, the Clinton administration directed the military to perform, during the first half of the 1990s, an unprecedented number of peace operations and humanitarian missions in support of its national security strategy of engagement and enlargement. Faced with a budget cap and an increased mission load of up to 400% for some services, military leaders were forced to raid other accounts, including future readiness, to pay for peace operations. General Charles Krulak, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, explains:

...Unfortunately, without raising the top line defense budget, the price of maintaining this degree [of current] readiness, given our aging equipment and increasing operational demands, has been paid for out of our modernization, base infrastructure and quality of life accounts.¹⁷

Former Undersecretary of State Robert B. Zoellick agrees:

The Executive Branch will need to recognize that extensive, frequent, and long deployments on peacekeeping, policing, and humanitarian missions are wearing down equipment, training, and ultimately people. Each mission may appear to be for a worthy cause, but at these budgetary levels, the U.S. military cannot do all of them and still be prepared for the future.

Today, America's military is being run ragged in reactive operations of all types around the globe. If the U.S. defense strategy and budget remains preoccupied with the current environment, the country will be risking the world's stability, its home territory and population, other vital interests, and the young men and women who put their lives on the line to safeguard their country. Most of all, it will be risking America's greatest cause: the future.¹⁸

A Matter of Priorities. Given the experience of America's Peacekeeping Decade, the nation is now faced with a major dilemma that is likely to serve as an appetite suppressant for peace operations as we enter the 21st Century. After delaying future programs in the 1990's—like modernization and pay increases—to pay for high OPTEMPO missions like Bosnia, Haiti, The Gulf and now Kosovo, there now exists a mismatch between the articulated national security strategy and the budget that funds that strategy—currently around three percent GDP. The problem is further exacerbated by the identification of new emerging threats—from terrorism to ballistic missile defense—that will compete against peace operations, with its strong humanitarian component, for future tax dollars. Additionally, the Administration and the Congress are beginning to see the military taking a more vital role in meeting the challenges of the global economy.

The U.S. military exists to execute a wide-range of functions articulated in the National Military Strategy (NMS) which is derived from the National Security Strategy (NSS). These functions range from minor humanitarian crisis to full-blown war. This strategy, prepared by the civilian leadership of the Executive Branch, coupled with oversight and funding from the Congress represents a disciplined process that keeps the limited capabilities of a downsized

military synchronized with governmental priorities. The NMS provides the discipline to keep a finite force, with warfighting as its number one priority, from being exhausted on every “good idea” that enters the national debate. When linked to this strategy, America’s military—still formidable after eight straight years of structure downsizing and 13 straight years of declining budgets (real buying power)—can react to protect or further “vital” and “important” national interests.¹⁹

In the fall of 1998, “A National Security Strategy for a New Century,” was released by the Clinton administration as the most recent codification of national security policy. Despite almost a decade of extensive peace operations and apologies for missed opportunities in places like Rwanda and Bosnia earlier in the decade, the 1998 version of the NSS was not expanded to embrace a vision of Pax Americana. It was broadened, instead, to undertake the new challenges of homeland defense where “protecting our citizens and critical infrastructures at home is an essential element of our strategy” and the health of the global economy where “our future prosperity depends upon a stable international financial system and robust global growth.”²⁰

This was a realistic approach given the limitations of a downsized government and the priorities of most Americans, who place individual security—both physical (personal) and financial (job)—over armed altruism. Americans “are wary about committing US forces into a crisis that has uncertain outcomes. When the American people are not directly threatened, their tendency is to remain detached” says Stephen Hook.²¹ Following the Cold War, America opted for a peace dividend, a balanced budget and low taxes instead of maintaining a large forces that would have been capable of performing multiple peace operations or humanitarian

missions. America rhetorically embraced the role as the world's leader during this period of global chaos, yet responded both in policy and funding, with a contradictory and restrained attitude.

The defense drawdown, rather than funding to achieve a Pax Americana, won out as the priority of the American people, as articulated by their elected and appointed leaders in the executive and legislative Branches. This peace dividend yielded \$750 billion in savings that have helped jumpstart the economy and contributed to the first budget surplus in 30 years, benefiting all Americans. However, despite this effort to reduce the cost of defense, America tried to “have its cake and eat it too” by inexplicably undertaking peace operations without congressional budget authority, public mandate or a firm policy. Rather than spend at the five percent GDP level for defense to fund an ambitious peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian agenda, the military was directed to undertake an unprecedented level of peace operations without the needed funding. This gap between funded military capabilities and the enthusiastic appetite to lead and “make a difference” throughout a complex and unstable world resulted in paying the bill with funds from current operations and readiness—near and long-term. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison of Texas highlights the impact on current readiness:

The Bosnia mission is contributing to a downward spiral of military readiness. The increased tempo of operations is costing money we haven't budgeted and is causing military recruitment and retention problems.

The Army has had its worst recruiting year since 1979. For every pilot the Air Force keeps, it loses two. The Navy is lowering educational standards to attract potential recruits. This raises training costs, drawing resources from weapons and equipment modernization.²²

An equal problem existed on the modernization side, commonly referred to as future readiness. Robert B. Zoellick, now president of the Center for International and Strategic

Studies, testified before Congress that there “has been a significant disconnect between the Pentagon’s security strategy planning and the defense budgets that are supposed to fund the strategy.”²³ He feels that the U.S. needs to spend 3.8% of its GDP on defense not the 3.0% that are currently being spent to keep up with the new demands of the strategy and to retrieve the slowdowns of the 1990’s.²⁴ That appears unlikely; as the budget is programmed to drop to 2.6% in 2003 making it even harder for peace operations to compete against more emotional issues like terrorism and ballistic missile defense, which were highlighted in the 1998 NSS.

At a time when a major increase is needed to “buy back” modernization and personnel retention programs that impact on future readiness, additional peace operations, like Kosovo, serve to slow the recovery and further widen the gap. This is sure to make future Administrations reluctant to undertake 21st Century missions and temp officials to fall back on the NSS and Presidential Decision Directive 25—unavailable in the early 1990s—which provides the justification for “selective and effective’ peace operations.²⁵ With no money allocated for unknown future peace operations, Mr. Zoellick weighed-in with legislators and policy makers:

The extra expenditures in the Administrations most recent proposal are focused primarily on just keeping up with today’s requirements. As a result, the United States is creating a problem different from the hollow force of the 1970’s; it is a failure of preparedness. We are not investing in the weapons and defenses the US will need for the future.²⁶

Increased Defense Spending. For fiscal year 2000, the defense budget was increased for the first time since the mid-1980s but this is still insufficient to fully fund the national security strategy and to “buy back” the degradation in readiness that occurred in the early part of the decade. Additionally, there is no money committed for potential peace endeavors or Kosovo

beyond September 1999. As long as a budget shortfall exists, the U.S. has no choice but to take an appetite suppressant on “purely humanitarian” peace operations and limit itself to only those high-payoff cases that can be directly linked to the vital or important national interests as articulated in the 1998 NSS. For example, the intervention in Kosovo was sold by policy makers as one of those high-payoff cases because of its national security component—destabilization of the region. It is likely that the Bosnia and Kosovo will take up to ten years, leaving little appetite for undertaking new peace operations, given the current national priorities.

In 1999, the administration began raising defense spending to fully fund the NMS through the out years and address the readiness and personnel shortfalls alluded by Senator Hutchison.²⁷ Since 1985, there has been a gradual decline in defense spending that was finally addressed by the administration in 1999 with a \$112b budget increase in the fiscal year 2000-2005 defense budgets. During that period, defense procurement declined 66% and the overall budget declined 40%. Unfortunately, this amount will only partly meet the needs of the services after years of neglect and increased requirements. For example, the year 2000 budget only partially meets the needs of the Army. While the budget satisfies some of the critical near-term readiness concerns, it is still \$2.6 billion short of the minimum requirement of which \$1.8 billion is required for modernization. In 1985, the American taxpayer paid \$21,000 per year for every man and women in the Army for modernization; today, it is only \$12,000, stated Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera.²⁸

Although the FY 2000 budget bolsters funding for people, training and quality of life, much damage has already been done during the 1990s that will impact recruiting and retention for an extended period of time. The migration of funds from quality of life programs and base

operations coupled with the lagging of military pay helped fund peace operations and other high OPTEMPO missions but resulted many soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines to vote with their feet and leave active service. The budget increases could prove to be too little too late for those who have been enduring the hardships of repetitive peacekeeping tours during the 1990s. Since the progressive leader development model unique to the military does not accommodate a mid-level entry leader program, this could have a profound impact on the next generation of mid-level officers and non-commissioned officers.

New Threats and Challenges

In addition to playing catch up in pay, retirement and modernization from the 1990s, peace and humanitarian operations will have to compete with new and emerging threats and priorities for limited defense dollars. The threats to U.S. personnel abroad, brought to the fore by Khobar Towers and the embassy bombings in Africa will take \$2.9b out of the defense budget. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), designed both to protect military personnel abroad, in addition to the 50 states, will take a large share of the budget in the out years. Additionally, the threat of chemical and biological weapons and their domestic terrorist implications will require addressing by the Department of Defense, placing another drain on resources.

Domestic Terrorism. For the first time in history, DoD will have to devote precious resources and focus to combat the threat of domestic terrorism. Traditionally, America has relied on its unique geographical position to isolate itself from potential enemies, with the only perceived threat coming from intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, with numerous Third World countries undertaking development programs for weapons of mass destruction, many Americans are concerned that U.S. cities are becoming potential targets for chemical or

biological terrorism. This concern has been articulated in the recent version National Security Strategy (1998) and will need to be resourced, causing competition for peace operations within the defense establishment for dollars.

Although, such domestic emergencies fall within the purview of civilian authorities, the military has unique response capabilities, particularly in the area of quick response and the deployability of medical, logistics and decontamination assets. Pressure has been mounting to draw from the military in a crisis response role. In 1998, ten National Guard teams were established to respond to chemical and biological attack anywhere in the country within four hours. In 1999, the Secretary of Defense sought approval for a permanent task force, headed by a general officer, to coordinate these actions in the event of attack. In the 2000 budget, the President has earmarked \$10 billion to protect the U.S. and its people against terrorist, weapons of mass destruction and potential computer attacks, the fiscal equivalent of three years of Bosnia type peacekeeping.²⁹

Missile Defense. Another new requirement that appeared in the recent version of the NSS is the emerging threat of missiles against our troops abroad and people at home. North Korea's open missile testing and Iran and Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East are just a few examples of what is occurring in over 20 countries the CIA has identified as developing both weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.³⁰

This raises big budget implications for the Department of Defense. The total defense budget for National Missile Defense from 1999 to 2005 will be \$10.5b, nearly triple the previous level that had been set. Some argue that the figure could go as high as \$13 billion to "develop, test and deploy."³¹ In the summer of 2000, the President will make a decision concerning the future

development and deployment that could make this one of the Pentagon's most expensive programs.

Theater missile defense, designed to protect our troops abroad, will also accelerate development. In January 1999, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, reiterated his support for the Army's Theater High Altitude Air Defense System, despite several flight test failures that jeopardized the program. At the same press conference, he announced that DoD would also fully fund the acquisition phase of the Navy's Theater Wide which, up to that point, had been only a technology system. His rationale was to accelerate the development so that both systems could be fielded as early as 2007 at an increased cost of half a billion dollars from 1999-2001.³²

Since both of these projects represent new expenditures to the defense budget, pressure will be on DoD to reduce expenditures in other areas if the domestic programs of the Clinton Administration and the balanced budget guidelines are to survive.³³ Base closures and nuclear weapons reductions will not be much help in the near-term. The Clinton administration had hoped to cut costs by closing unneeded bases in 2001 and 2005, however, it is unlikely that there will be any benefit in the near-term and it could actually produce a negative effect if not approved by Congress or closing costs become excessive. According to Robert Bell at the NSC: "We need new authority [to conduct base closures] – in fact, our budget projections assume we'll win approval for that."³⁴ However, in the spring of 1999, Congress ruled out base closures for the immediate future, creating another budget dilemma as those optimistic budget projections will need to be revised. Additionally, failure to implement the Start II treaty—over differences with the Russians over BMD—could result in having that expensive arsenal

maintained in the outyears, another unforecasted expenditure that puts a further dent in the same defense budget that supports peace operations.

The High Cost of Peace Operations. The U.S. military is a “strategy-based force.”

Strategy defines requirements, which in turn determines our force structure and modernization needs. General Dennis Reimer, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, reminded Congress in recent testimony that:

The triumphs and failures of American military history can be traced through how well we have kept the demands of strategy and the requirements for military force in balance. When the link between strategy and our rationale for retaining and modernizing forces remained clear and compelling, the military proved an effective instrument of national policy. When strategy and military capability drifted apart we put both our national interests and the men and women of the armed forces at risk.³⁵

Nothing in the post-Cold War period threatens this delicate balance more than peace operations and humanitarian missions, where it is not difficult on any given day to find a opportunity where America “can make a difference,” to use the president’s words. However, given the desire to keep taxes low and balance the budget, one must heed General Reimer’s words and those of his successor, General Eric Shinseki, as he reflected on the impact of Kosovo at his confirmation hearing:

Each additional contingency operation impacts the Army’s ability to remain focused on its warfighting requirements. I am concerned about the prospects of a long-term commitment to Kosovo with ground forces...We have a missions and resource mismatch. It’s premature to say that raising the end strength is the right call, but end strength is a legitimate concern.³⁶

The primary mission of the US military has never been humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, expunging evil from the world or other any other altruistic endeavor, and the post-Cold War period should be no exception. As Professor Barry Posen of

MIT pointed out at a panel at Harvard on Rwanda in 1998, “Armed altruism is rare and when nations use it, they are stingy.” The challenges of the post-Cold War Era are different and the Department of Defense is underfunded to perform the many tasks it is currently assigned, even with President Clinton’s projected defense increase of \$112 billion over the next six years. Former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger states that, “we don’t have the forces to intervene everywhere...we are not able to control everything irrespective of the illusions that have developed after the collapse of the Soviet Union.”³⁷ He feels the Clinton Administration has taken an “all-too-expansive definition of national interest.” Former-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger points out:

We can’t get involved in every ethnic conflict as a police force without sooner or later getting overextended.³⁸

...that America’s military power is available to enable every ethnic or religious group to achieve self-determination? Is NATO to become the artillery for ethnic conflict? If Kosovo, why not East Africa or Central Asia?³⁹

The Army senior leader explains the high cost of peace operations:

I am in complete agreement that the U.S. must be a global player and engagement is in our best interest, but our engagement can only go so far. There is a culminating point beyond which engagement can be sustained without endangering our vital interests: Security and economic prosperity. Engagement can have a negative effect on the military, and the security of the nation, if we fail to fully grasp the state of the current military.⁴⁰

For example, every unit in the active U.S. Army and U.S. Army Reserve is linked to a validated warplan directed against the DoD’s primary mission of deterring conflict and if that fails, to “fight and win our nations wars.”⁴¹ Although a secondary mission exists for conflict prevention and peacetime activities, no forces are fenced for these contingencies. There are no specialized peacekeeping units from which to draw for Bosnia, Kosovo, the Sinai, Haiti or

Macedonia or other such missions. Forces are justified and equipment procured based on wartime missions and strategies and each unit always has a mission to be combat ready to execute its specific warplans.⁴²

When a unit is assigned to do a peacekeeping mission, a calculated risk is taken in executing the war and contingency plans of the United States. Prior to Kosovo, the Army's ability to handle a second major theater war under the current strategy was already at high risk.⁴³ One of the risks comes in eroding readiness, for as soon as a unit is identified for a peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission it ceases combat training and begins focusing on the new task at hand. As a force becomes better trained in its peacekeeping mission, its combat skills atrophy over time, eventually to the point where it can no longer be considered combat deployable without some period of additional training. For continuous peace operations, like Bosnia, this condition affects two or three other units at the same time for each unit deployed. For every unit on location performing a peace operation, there is another performing intense training in the preparation phase to relieve that unit at the end of its six-month deployment. Additionally, there is another unit that has recently returned from its deployment—whose wartime skills have atrophied—that is trying to regain the combat edge through collective maneuver training and refitting.

Stay-behind units are also impacted, representing the equivalent of yet another unit, as they are required to help evaluate, prepare and “push out” a unit for peace operations, disrupting its own unit training and affecting its readiness for war. Stay-behind units also provide “fillers” for shortages in deploying units as Major General David L. Grange explains:

It took over 60,000 soldiers from units in Germany and the continental U.S. to maintain approximately 23,000 troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia...Units left behind also suffered decreases in readiness status as sister units deploy for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) operations. This is due to partial manning of all but the Army's highest-priority units. Since units deploying on MOOTW operations receive additional resources, all of their personnel and equipment shortages must be filled from the units not deploying.⁴⁴

Disciplined choices in peace operations. The best way to keep the United States from becoming party to every good idea that comes along is to always link peace operations to the national security and national military strategies. The current revision of the NSS provides for the advancement of U.S. national interests and places peacekeeping and peace enforcement in the category of "important national interests" as opposed to higher priority "vital national interests." These "(national) interests do not affect our national survival, but they do affect our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live."⁴⁵ The U.S. involvement as part of the NATO operations in Bosnia and Kosovo are two such examples.

Although such operations is not of primary importance to the survival and vitality of our nation, as is the case of vital interests, they can be secondarily linked to these interests due to our security and economic ties with Europe.

We have a clear national interest in assuring that Kosovo is where the fighting ends...Potentially, it could affect our allies, Greece and Turkey. It could spark tensions in Bosnia itself, jeopardizing our gains there.⁴⁶

President Clinton

Although, peace operations have a negative impact on readiness, raise budget challenges and contribute to the attrition of people from the military, this remains a valuable tool in the national security arsenal to support U.S. national interests—economic, diplomatic or military. Oftentimes a peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation can preempt or prevent a conflict

that would eventually involve the United States at a more dangerous or costly stage down the spectrum of violence. However, contemplating such actions should always involve a direct link to the strategy and only after the cost/benefit analysis reveals a high payoff . Also, an eye must always be given to asset preservation, for the U.S. military is unique in its ability to engage in the use of force on behalf of the American people. This is not a responsibility can be deferred to another segment of American society, allies or the UN as Charles Krauthammer reminds us:

America's military has a different job: imposing itself—deploying its massive sophisticated forces to strike and fight—where the stakes are high and the cause is clear. Liberating an invaded Kuwait was precisely such an instance, as is protecting South Korea and Taiwan. In Bosnia, the most powerful and sophisticated army in the world is sitting in the rain and the mud at the cost of more than \$20 billion and counting. What a colossal waste—and drain. As the protector of last resort, the United States needs to husband its resources for great exertions, not dissipate them in a thousand stagnant fens.⁴⁷

With that responsibility in mind, it is also important, however, for the U.S. to remain engaged and exercise leadership to protect and advance national interests in a global economy and defense policy provides for that:

U.S. leadership can deter aggression, foster the peaceful resolution of conflicts, encourage stable and free foreign markets, promote democracy, and inspire others to create a safer world and to resolve global problems. Without active U.S. leadership and engagement abroad, threats to U.S. security will worsen and opportunities will narrow. Peace operations provide the United States with an effective and flexible instrument to cope with the dynamic nature of the international environment.⁴⁸

A Case for Selective Engagement. Given America's reluctance to increase defense spending dramatically (5% GDP in the near-term and 4% GDP steady state), to accommodate an ambitious peace operations agenda plus address the priorities identified in the NSS it would seem logical to consider a policy of selective engagement in the 21st Century. Such a strategy, along the lines articulated by Barry Posen, Andrew Ross and Robert Art, would allow for the

short-term investment of around 4% GDP (Zoellick) with a goal to eventually return to the traditional 3% GDP steady state advocated by most Americans.

Advocates of selective engagement do start from the premise that resources are scarce: it is simply impossible to muster sufficient power and will to keep domestic and international peace worldwide, or to preserve the United States as the undisputed leader in the unipolar world.⁴⁹

Selective engagement enthusiasts don't look at each violent conflict in a vacuum and suppress the urge to get involved in ethnic conflicts. They look at the world holistically and concern themselves only with those conflicts that impact the security arrangements of the major powers. They would view humanitarian interventions as an issue to be settled by normal U.S. domestic processes, say Posen and Ross. "The most important strategic question is the opportunity cost."⁵⁰ For example, the U.S. might undertake an effort like Hurricane Mitch because it was determined to be less expensive, in the long-term, to have a thriving Latin America than deal for years with a with a depressed one.

In their critique of selective engagement, Posen and Ross note that the strategy lacks a certain romance compared to other strategies, "there is very little idealism or commitment to principle behind the strategy...It focuses very narrowly on interests defined in terms of power."⁵¹ However, given the reluctance of the American taxpayer to fund an ambitious peace operations agenda, perhaps this is exactly what the nation needs.

Such a policy would be geared toward defending the United States and its vital interests by promoting peace among the major powers in a balance of power arrangement, containing ethnic conflict rather than getting involved in it and only occasionally intervening in humanitarian crises.⁵²

Humanitarian Imperialism. Retired Marine general Bernard Trainor of Harvard believes that “the age of American imperialism is coming to a close.”⁵³ He feels that neo-isolationism is on the rise and the public has grown tired of the “indecisive moral crusades that have led us into Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo” and they “will demand that military deployments be tied to concrete and narrowly defined national interests.”⁵⁴ Whether the American people have lost their appetite for such ventures will be a matter for debates in the years ahead. One thing is sure, at 2.9% GDP, DoD is not funded to perform an ambitious peace operations agenda in the 21st Century. In reality, America has already signed up for a selective engagement strategy with The Balkans as the area of choice for the next ten to fifteen years and there will be little room to accommodate new operations for at least the first decade of the next millennium.

Summary. After extensive peace operations in the 1990s and the corresponding public debate throughout that period, America has yet to adopt a proactive peace operations agenda or budget. In fact, the trend is in the other direction, based the most recent document outlining our national security strategy--the 1998 NSS. The nation, facing numerous new threats and challenges—such as terrorism and securing U.S. interests in the global economy—and determined to maintain a balanced budget without raising taxes will likely be forced to take an “appetite suppressant” on peace operations during the early part of the next century. The cost of peace of operations of the past decade was absorbed at the expense of near-term readiness and future military capabilities and that legacy of the 1990s is unlikely to be forgotten as lawmakers and future administrations fully absorb the impact..

MYTH #2: U.S. peace operations—peacekeeping and peace enforcement—need to be casualty free to gain the support of the American people. The quick withdrawal in Somalia,

following the Battle of Mogadishu, shows intolerance for casualties in peace operations, while the lack of casualties in Bosnia and Kosovo shows how support can be sustained when a less aggressive approach is taken.

REALITY: Americans are willing to accept casualties on military missions that it considers compelling. The unwillingness to accept casualties in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti and Kosovo can be attributed to the relative importance of such missions to the American public. Historically, other armed interventions—like the Dominican Republic and Lebanon—have elicited the same reaction. Military operations are inherently dangerous, including peacetime training. The risk of casualties will always be present, when soldiers are deployed. Examples include: a breakdown in the peace agreement, a terrorist incident, or even a criminal act could lead to violence against American servicemen or women. American policy should not depend on luck. If the case is compelling enough to accept casualties, we should commit; if not, we shouldn't.

The United States' unwillingness to accept casualties is perceived in other parts of the world as a lack of commitment.

Ambassador Jayant Prasad, India

The American approach to peace operations is wrong. Rather than committing forces to causes that the American people find compelling—where the consequences sometimes are costly, but acceptable, the tendency today is to commit to causes of lesser importance that avoid the issue altogether by instructing the military to perform casualty free operations. For example, in Bosnia, a cautious approach was with emphasis more toward avoiding catastrophe rather than achieving quick success. This was accomplished by choosing to favor force protection over the apprehension of war criminals, a key confidence building measure affecting

the return of the refugees. To date, this has still has not been achieved, three years after implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. Former Ambassador Richard Holbrooke explains, “(Admiral Smith) made it clear that he intended to take a minimalist approach to all aspects of the implementation other than force protection.” Admiral Smith even stated that “I don’t have the authority to arrest anybody,” which in Ambassador Holbrooke’s words “dangerously narrowed his own authority.”⁵⁵

To date the greatest limitation on military peace operations has been the perceived intolerance of the American people to accept combat casualties on missions underwritten in the name of peace. This perception evolved from the disaster in Somalia followed a few years later by the decision to deploy peace forces to Bosnia without public or congressional approval. Richard Holbrooke reports in his book that 70% of the American public was against the deployment of peacekeeping forces to Bosnia in 1995. In the post-Somalia era, without a mandate from the American people and their elected representatives, the administration directed that this is a casualty free operation. This did not need to be the case and Ambassador Holbrooke and others feel that more might have been accomplished in Bosnia had we undertaken a more ambitious and aggressive military agenda.

America and Casualties. There is a popular perception — at home and abroad — that America has no tolerance for casualties and that when public opinion erodes as a result of high casualties, the United States will withdraw from the conflict. However, history is replete with examples of cases where high casualties led to negative public opinion, yet the fighting continued for years. For example, in the Civil War, the Battle of Antietam claimed over 20,000 casualties in one day, yet the war raged on for three more years. Korea and Vietnam, commonly

perceived as wars that were stopped by public opinion, claimed over 348,000 casualties, including 81,000 deaths spanning three consecutive decades. A RAND study addresses this paradox:

A detailed analysis of polls taken during both wars shows that as the conflicts continued and casualties and costs . . . mounted, public opinion did indeed become disillusioned with America's involvement, with more and more Americans regretting the original decision to intervene.

There was, however, very little movement in the percentage of Americans polled who wished the United States to withdraw from the conflict. In fact, a growing number of Americans favored escalation of the conflicts to bring them back to a quick — and victorious — end.⁵⁶

Escalation to win appears to be the American preference when faced with the dilemma of mounting casualties in wars and most armed regional conflicts. Polls for Korea and Vietnam showed “an inverse relationship between ‘approval’ of the intervention and the public’s desire to escalate to achieve the decisive results.”⁵⁷ For Korea, in April 1952, 49 percent of people polled wanted to attack the Communist Chinese while only 16 percent favored bringing the troops home. There was even at one point a 47 percent approval rating to “attack the Communist forces with everything we have.”⁵⁸ Throughout the war, 77 percent of those polled opted not to withdraw and “those favoring escalation always greatly outnumbered those favoring withdrawal — from a margin of two to one at the beginning of the conflict to almost five to one for the period after July 1951.”⁵⁹

Vietnam, the RAND report states, was even a more compelling example of public support for escalation as conflicts continue. As in Korea, public support fell as casualties mounted while support for escalation went up, presumably to complete the mission and get the troops home

victoriously. From 1965 to 1968, 77 percent of the people polled in the RAND study favored remaining in Vietnam versus 12 percent favoring withdrawal.

By November 1967, those favoring escalation exceeded those favoring fighting at the same level of effort by nearly five to two, and those favoring escalation exceeded those favoring withdrawal by nearly five to one. ‘Approval’ of the war was inversely related to the desire to escalate the conflict.⁶⁰

The Gulf War provides a contemporary example that is consistent with the aforementioned desire of the public to gain victory and “not quit,” despite the fear of high U.S. casualties. Although initial public support to “drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait” yielded only 37 percent to 52 percent approval ratings in Gallup polls in the six weeks leading up to the Senate vote on Iraq, support rose to 83 percent once the war started. This support existed despite the fact that 83 percent believed that “high numbers of casualties would result on both sides” and that “Iraq will use chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons (82 percent).” More surprisingly, 67 percent of the public wanted to exceed the UN mandate, not stop once the stated objectives were met; “they wanted America to press on until Saddam was removed from power.” Clearly, America wanted a “decisive victory,” and the casualty issue was subordinate to this overarching goal.⁶¹

Despite occurring in the single-superpower era and before the same post-Cold War audience as that of Operation Desert Storm, the same level of success could not be achieved in Somalia — less than three years later. Clearly, Somalia demonstrated that humanitarian intervention was not viewed in the same context by the same American public that reacted positively to the use of force in the Gulf. In fact, the Somalia reaction more closely resembles another category of military operations where the populace has shown a low tolerance to accept casualties:

Prolonged interventions in complex political situations in failed states characterized by civil conflict, in which U.S. interests and principles are typically much less compelling, or clear, and in which success is often elusive at best. past examples of this type include interventions in the Dominican Republic (1965) and Lebanon (1982-1984).⁶²

Eric V. Larsen argues that the relative importance of the casualty issue can be linked to the perception of benefits and prospects. There are cases where the benefits may be “as — or more — important than casualties in determining support.” However, he adds, “There is strong evidence that declining perceived benefits or prospects erode public support. In short, Americans do not want to sacrifice lives for causes they do not consider compelling.”⁶³

A study of Somalia clearly shows that this operation, despite its noble origins and initial public support, didn’t fall into Larsen’s category where the desired benefits are equal to or more important than casualties. Initially, there was strong support from the people and Congress for providing forces for the safeguarding of humanitarian supply deliveries, even though the area had little geo-strategic significance to the United States and was not linked to our vital interests. However, for some reason, that public support for providing forces was never synonymous with a willingness to incur any casualties, as it was realized later. In fact, Larsen feels that public support was not only contingent upon the pursuit of the initial humanitarian objective, but, in fact, had another component: the mission had to be accomplished with few-to-no casualties.⁶⁴

In Somalia, the U.S. forces were withdrawn after a failed raid on a clan leader claimed the lives of 18 American servicemen on 3 October 1993. Following this setback, the United States simply gave up the mission rather than bolster security — with additional forces — as was consistent reaction in most military commitments throughout history.⁶⁵ Although the catastrophic results of the Battle of Mogadishu provided the ultimate trigger for this major policy decision,

public support had been waning in the months since the reality of casualties had become apparent. In June of 1993, 26 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed by locals, followed by seven U.S. deaths in two incidents during August and September. By the end of September, public support had totally eroded for the mission, prompting Congress to threaten to cut off funds on 15 November 1993 if the mission continued. In Washington, the long-overdue draft policy on peace operations — a fairly solid document — was nearing approval, but now had to be completely rewritten to address the political fallout of the Somalia debacle.

“No single event has done as much to influence peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era,” states Mark Bowden, who authored a study on the incident. He argues that the Somalia mission continues to haunt American peacekeeping decisions to this day and served to delay American involvement in Haiti, Rwanda and Bosnia.⁶⁶ Bowden argues that: “In the five years since the humanitarian mission dissolved into combat, Somalia has had a profoundly cautionary influence on American foreign policy. He concludes that the lesson to be learned from Somalia is: If the mission is not worth the loss of life, you don’t undertake it.”⁶⁷

The lesson to be drawn from Somalia is not that Americans are not willing to take casualties for peace operations, but, rather, that they do not consider the types of operations that the nation has committed them to in the 1990s to be compelling. In short, the test should be: “is it important enough to incur losses?” Not, “how should we avoid casualties?” Commanders will always place a high premium on the protection of those placed in their charge, but it should take more than luck to validate a policy.⁶⁸

The limitation that the fear of casualties has placed on the use of the military has some in Congress troubled. Rep. Donald Payne (D) of New Jersey stated, “This whole question about

the reluctance [to put] the United States military at any place that is dangerous has to really be rethought.” He feels that such a philosophy weakens the ability of the United States to act independently and effectively and believes that “we have to get a redefinition of what a military force is and the realities of a military force. No one wants to hear about casualties.”⁶⁹ Then-senator Sam Nunn made the same observation when Congress was debating Bosnia:

I don’t want to see us evolve to a point where we have expectations in this country of a war where nobody gets killed on either side, and where we don’t have any collateral damage on the other side.⁷⁰

The former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General John Shalikashvili, agreed: “I think maybe that issue is an outgrowth of Desert Storm, followed by our experience in Somalia, and I am very concerned about that.”⁷¹

This reluctance appears to manifest itself most with respect to cases where troops have the potential to be committed on the ground. Other aspects of the application of U.S. military power in support of peace operations have enjoyed greater freedom from public scrutiny, particularly when the total numbers of Americans at risk are small. For example, NATO airstrikes in Bosnia prior to Dayton proved very effective in enforcing UN resolutions and was one of many significant factors in bringing the Serbs to the bargaining table at Dayton.⁷² However, when U.S. Air Force pilot Captain Scott O’Grady was shot down on 2 June 1994, the resulting press coverage brought the support for the UN operation in Bosnia to an all-time low.

When NATO considered action to persuade Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to ease up on his crackdown on the rebels in Kosovo, it decided to launch Operation Deliberate Falcon, a show of force consisting of 89 aircraft, as a first step. “Was this the best way to send

a message?” Earnest Blazar asked. “Perhaps, but it sure was the best way to employ U.S. forces without ruffling the feathers of the people at home.”⁷³ Then-Brigadier General Charles F. Wald, head of the Air Force’s long-range strategy office, explained:

The only alternative is to go and put 13,000 troops on the ground. You don’t hear the American public arguing over Albania. . . . They aren’t [protesting] in front of the White House saying we can’t have that. You put 13,000 troops on the ground, and I guarantee you the president is going to hear about that.⁷⁴

Gen. Wald’s statement almost a year before Kosovo was prophetic. When the U.S., as part of NATO, decided to deal with the Kosovo problem, the idea of committing ground troops was immediately taken off the table by the Administration, presumably to reassure the American people that massive casualties would not be incurred. In the Spring of 1999 a successful air campaign, designed to avoid casualties, resulted in loss of life in almost three months of combat operations, an enviable statistic even for a large-scale training exercise.

The public — and some political leaders — tend to object to casualties among U.S. forces employed in non-ground missions only as they occur, rather than during the planning, as is typical in the case of the commitment of large ground formations. This phenomenon seems logical, as ground forces are subject to a wide variety of “around-the-clock” dangers such as terrorism, mines and counterattack that are not applicable to offshore vessels or distant airbases that are sometimes used for peace operations. The danger for air and naval forces is perceived as being smaller and less risky, due to their high-tech nature, and apparently more acceptable to the public — until something happens.

If ground troops are involved, the perceived casualty limitation has been observed to influence even the most benign missions. For example, the U.S. contingent that was part of the

750-person UN force in Macedonia came under criticism in the media during April 1998 as the violence in Kosovo highlighted peacekeeping operations in the region. Although the official mission of the 350-person U.S. force was only to monitor and report, rather than stop the fighting should it erupt, *The Washington Post* found that the United States took extraordinary precautions to ensure that U.S. troops are kept “farther from harm’s way than troops of other nations.”⁷⁵ Specifically, the *Post* reported that American troops were under strict instructions not to venture within 300 yards of the border and monitored two-thirds less of the border area than that patrolled by the Nordic Battalion. The Scandinavian soldiers, it was reported, greatly resented these restrictions and accused the Americans of not being able to observe key territory in their sector. A foreign official stated that the U.S. approach was for “domestic consumption” and that “they do not want to risk having to explain to Congress why any American became a casualty in Macedonia.”⁷⁶

Policy Implications of a Flawed Perception. The perceived low tolerance for casualties brought to the fore by Somalia resulted in the clearly defined policy for peace operations doctrine that America had badly needed but had failed to develop in the early 1990s. Presidential Decision Directive 25, “The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,” was finally released in May 1994, just six months after the Battle of Mogadishu. It called for U.S. peace operations to be more “selective and effective” and recognized peace operations as just one tool in the foreign policy suite of potential options to prevent and resolve conflict. PDD-25 listed numerous factors that must be considered before the U.S. would participate in peace operations, including a cease-fire and the consent of

the parties involved in cases where traditional peacekeeping (Chapter VI) operations were being considered.⁷⁷

Although PDD-25 provided drastically needed discipline on the decision to commit to new peacekeeping operations, it has come under much criticism due the Somalia experience and the limits on casualties that influenced the policy's development. Adam Roberts writes:

PDD-25 is vulnerable to many criticisms. In particular, the characteristic and understandable U.S. anxiety to work out in advance an end point to an operation, coupled with the equally understandable U.S. worry about casualties, can actually encourage local leaders to be obstinate, knowing that they can outlast an embattled peacekeeping force.⁷⁸

There are other policy implications evolving from the low casualty record of recent peace operations, and the perceptions they reinforce. In December 1997, the *Washington Times* reported that the “zero tolerance” for casualties makes it easier for an administration to send troops abroad. If the Pentagon can guarantee near-zero casualties, opposition to a deployment narrows.”⁷⁹ However, such an expectation puts tremendous pressure on the military leaders on the ground to focus on force protection instead of the primary mission and begs a difficult question: If some casualties are incurred, as a cost of doing business, will this undermine an otherwise sound policy? The zero tolerance limitation has even been turned around to support extensions of ongoing peace operations. When government leaders realized that the U.S. would be unable to withdraw from Bosnia in one year, as predicted, the fact that we had not sustained any casualties became one justification for a continued presence.

However, this trend of predicting unrealistically low casualties to help support dangerous operations has begun to cause a concern for Executive Branch leaders.⁸⁰ In his remarks to the National Defense University class on 29 January 1998, President Clinton reminded military

leaders (and the American people) that “it is not easy to wear the uniform and it is never a completely safe proposition.” He went on to add:

We must be strong and tough and mature as a nation — strong and tough and mature enough to recognize that even the best-prepared, best-equipped force will suffer losses in action. . . . Every casualty is a tragedy all its own for a parent or a child or a friend. But when the cause is just and the purpose clear, our military men and women are prepared to take that risk. . . . The American people have to be, as well.⁸¹

Force Protection. The near-zero tolerance for combat casualties has raised the premium on force protection disproportionately. What was traditionally just one of many important tasks for a military commander has now become the top priority to many as a direct result of the new evolving standard. This new primacy of force protection often occurs at the expense of the mission. Although civilian leaders — including the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense — have been careful to keep force protection in its proper perspective as “an integral part of mission accomplishment” rather than the mission itself, that feeling is not accepted universally down the chain.⁸² For example, General Wilhem of U.S. Southern Command stated it as his top priority in congressional testimony:

The unrest generated by political instability requires us to constantly reassess the safety and security environment in which our troops are living and working. I have recommended that we terminate our permanent military presence in Haiti and conduct routine periodic engagement activities. In the interim we will continue to make force protection ‘job one’ for our deployed forces, we will not let down our guard.⁸³

Another example would be the air campaign in Kosovo where NATO air power avoided casualties and only lost two planes but failed to stop the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo because the attacks we conducted above 15,000 feet where the aircrews were at minimal risk to Yugoslav Army air defense fire.

Why so Conservative? The terrorist attack on Khobar Towers did for force protection what Somalia did for the tolerance of casualties. On 25 June 1996, a terrorist truck bomb exploded at the U.S. forces housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia claiming the lives of 19 airmen deployed in support of Operation Southern Watch. Fortunately, the public viewed this operation — which occurred in an active combat zone — in the context of U.S.-Iraq confrontation, rather than as a peace operation or even a traditional peacetime operation. Had the reaction been otherwise, the entire U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf could have been jeopardized. This incident brought the issue of casualties to center stage plus raised the standard of personal accountability to an unprecedented level that still impacts all U.S. operations, as was recently seen in the Kosovo air campaign and what is currently being seen on the ground in Kosovo and Bosnia.

Following the terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia, an exhaustive investigation was undertaken. The resulting report to the President outlined massive institutional changes in the Department of Defense, including appointing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the DOD-wide focal point for all force protection activities. Additionally, in July 1997, Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced he was removing the responsible commander, Air Force Brigadier General Terryl Schwailer, from the two-star promotion list despite the fact that he “ably discharged his primary mission of enforcing the no-fly zone in Southern Iraq,” further citing that “we expect a high standard of performance of our commanders in the field who are entrusted with the safety of our troops.” He added that “field commanders . . . are accountable for all that their units do or fail to do.”⁸⁴

Although the Secretary made it clear in his statement that enforcing the no-fly zone was the primary mission of Operation Southern Watch, the personal accountability issue for force protection reverberated down through the services. He stated: “All in the chain of command need to draw from this experience those lessons, however painful, which may help others who follow, and who will be at similar risk.” Regrettably, many careerist commanders began treating this as their primary mission when deployed for operations. An example of how some have interpreted these developments can be found in this innocent and well-intentioned U.S. Air Force announcement on the internet entitled, “Force Protection Is Job One For U.S. Forces In Saudi Arabia.”⁸⁵

The criticism that avoiding casualties, rather than accomplishing the mission, has become the primary purpose of the military is well documented in peace operations all over the globe, including The Balkans. A review of the Department of Defense’s definition of force protection reveals some ambitious tasks and challenges; all of which are defensive in nature. Implementation of this program, sure to preserve lives, will not in itself accomplish the mission. The DOD dictionary defines force protection as a security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence and other security programs.⁸⁶

In combat, a commander can ill afford to substitute force protection — or any other important task — in the place of the stated mission without jeopardizing the successful accomplishment of the campaign or battle. If he is too conservative and lacks the aggressiveness

to pursue the objective, then this will be apparent in the outcome where he must balance force protection and operational freedom. Force protection and other important priorities compete with one another and are balanced delicately to achieve overall mission success. In peace operations, since success revolves around so many other factors — economic, governmental, diplomatic, humanitarian — the military can rarely carry the entire operation to a successful conclusion on its own. But, given the intolerance to casualties for missions of questionable value to the American people, the military component can certainly cause the overall operation to fail in the court of public opinion. Therefore, the temptation exists today for military commanders to decide to play “not to lose” rather than “to win.” The Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review (BHAAR I) Conference Report published by the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute concluded:

In OJE (Operation Joint Endeavor) the force protection effort rose to the level of actually being part of the stated mission and above the level of the other three battlefield combat dynamics (firepower, leadership, maneuver) . . . Additionally, the perception among the participants was that force protection measures in OJE were not based on a valid risk assessment, often stifled the operational commander’s flexibility, and clearly fostered the overall perception of a “zero defects” mentality/environment.”⁸⁷

Many political and military leaders now feel that risk management, integral to all military operations, does not include taking risks with the lives of America’s sons and daughters in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili expressed his concern to Congress:

Not only are we setting a standard by which this country will judge us but . . . that might begin to have an impact on our young [commanders who] have the sense that if they go into an operation, and despite their best efforts, suffer casualties, that someone’s going to be looking over their shoulders. How tragic it would be if we did that because we would grow a group of leaders who, through their hesitancy, would begin to endanger people.⁸⁸

For example, today's military commanders in Bosnia are often being criticized by civilian relief agencies and think tanks for not doing more to enforce the nonmilitary tasks of the Dayton Peace Accords in Annexes 1B through 11. The BHAAR I reported:

Many participants felt that U.S. force protection measures seemed to be politically motivated and clearly not based on a realistic threat assessment. . . . Force protection requirements severely limited CSS (combat service support) availability to support nonmilitary functions.

More importantly, the U.S. levels of force protection were significantly different from other nations. These inconsistencies lead to two specific areas of concern. First, stringent U.S. force protection measures directly hampered civil-military cooperation and the ability for U.S. soldiers to move away from the peace enforcement mission only mindset. Second . . . many non-U.S. members were concerned the this inconsistency was sending mixed signals to the warring factions.⁸⁹

This move to politically-motivated accountability stemming from the fear of casualties has raised the premium on force protection to a disturbing level. Uniformed leaders, however, should not be faulted for their reluctance to limit their involvement to their formal tasks, given the stakes involved. Casualties in peace operations have national political and policy consequences that military leaders feel they are not empowered to risk. The senior leader and organizational energy required for the additional tasks outlined in the Dayton Peace Accords is being expended, first, on the stated tasks (Annex 1A, Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement) and then on force protection.⁹⁰ Annex 1A states what the military is formally required to accomplish, while other non-specified tasks are interpreted, by many, as competing with force protection focus.

The caution in Bosnia is has precedent in the post-Cold War peace operations world. The UN Macedonia experience occurred prior to Bosnia, chronologically. When Major General

W.H. Yates, deployed an infantry battalion from The Berlin Brigade to perform the first U.S. peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, he noted:

My initial concern for the task force deploying to Operation ABLE SENTRY was force protection. Some UN military commanders don't understand our preoccupation with this issue because they are not faced with the same threat as U.S. forces. They don't understand that because we are the American Army, we are an isolated target of opportunity.⁹¹

His concern appears to be justified, as the U.S. forces in Macedonia—one of the smallest contingents there—was singled out for the “snatch” operation by the Yugoslav Army during the Kosovo Conflict where three American soldiers were abducted inside Macedonia and taken deep into Serbia.

To mitigate some of this danger, U.S. commanders and diplomats have been forced to take a harder line in the types of missions the United States is willing to accept during particular peace operations. Previously, it was often assumed that the military would provide a wide range of functions commensurate with its robust capabilities, particularly during times of peace where competing priorities were minimal. These expectations were particularly high in areas where the environment is austere, like Somalia, or where the infrastructure has been destroyed, as in the case of Bosnia. However, given the renewed emphasis on force protection and the development of a more defined doctrine in PDD-25, the military is shying away from additional tasks that are not specifically mandated by the national command authorities.

A specific area that has come under criticism in Bosnia is the issue of the apprehension of indicted war criminals, particularly Radivan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, the Serb political and military leaders during the Bosnian War. While most agree that this is one of most significant tasks still to be completed in Bosnia, there appears to be little U.S. military support

for an operation to secure their arrest. Although conventional combat and special operations forces are more than capable of such a task, some casualties would be inevitable, military planners believe. Since the apprehension of war criminals is not a formal task outlined in Annex 1A of the Dayton Peace Accords (the military annex), the military is not formally compelled to perform such a mission. In the absence of such direct guidance, the focus shifts to force protection, which, in the case of Bosnia, was enough to leave this task uncompleted.

Many argue that the main reluctance to apprehend war criminals is the unwillingness to accept casualties either in the apprehensions themselves or from potential retaliation by their affected groups. In Somalia, the conflict between UN forces and the Habre Gedir clan and its leader, Mohammed Farah Aidid, underscores the dangers of going after specific groups or individuals. Over time, the original security mission there escalated into a war between the clan and the U.S. peacekeepers. In Bosnia, a more aggressive campaign toward apprehending war criminals by the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) was viewed by some as an unnecessary risk to peacekeepers, a carry-over from the experience in Somalia. Many military leaders resent the notion that the problems encountered in recruiting, training and standing up an international police force should automatically default this problem to the military component of the operation — SFOR.

By the summer of 1998, the issue came to a head and the *New York Times* reported that decisions had been made to abandon plans for a secret military operation to apprehend these individuals, citing **concerns within the military over casualties**.⁹² After an estimated expenditure of \$100 million on intelligence gathering and the deployment of special operations forces to Europe, “White House officials — including President Clinton — could not convince the military

that arresting the indicted men was a risk worth taking, present and former administration officials said.”⁹³ Ambassador Peter Galbraith, the former U.S. ambassador to Croatia and a strong supporter of apprehension, stated: “They’ve [the military] been cautious. One wants one’s military to be cautious and careful, but still operational.”⁹⁴

It was not surprising to those familiar with the 1990s force protection emphasis to see that the air campaign in Kosovo was conducted in such a manor as to eliminate or minimize casualties. Weapons systems designed to be most effective at much closer distances were being employed at safe altitudes to minimize crew exposure to enemy air defenses. Not only did this marginalize their effectiveness, such tactics may have contributed to collateral damage, as the exaggerated standoff distances made target acquisition difficult. Also, as mentioned before, it did little to prevent the ethnic cleansing.

In conclusion, all military operations are inherently dangerous and peace operations are no exception. The American people have historically shown that they are willing to accept casualties when they consider causes compelling. Unfortunately, this lesson was lost in Kosovo where the myth that Americans are unprepared to accept casualties prevailed. Since The Balkans was being portrayed as a national security issue (stability of the region) as well as an humanitarian crisis, that myth might have been shattered, had a more aggressive approach been taken. Instead, we are destined to continue to see U.S. force commanders focused primarily on force protection, potentially jeopardizing the peace mission and unnecessarily prolonging operations. Partial or prolonged successes in these missions for this reason will further serve as an appetite suppressant for peace operations from a reduced military in the early 21st Century.

Myth 3: Increased use of the reserve components (RC) for peace operations is a cheap way to take the burden off the active forces which would translate into improvements in active component readiness, quality of life and retention.

The Guard does everything from providing active duty forces in overseas missions, like those in Bosnia and Iraq, to managing emergency situations here at home, from train derailments to tornadoes and floods. The National Guard provides a wide range of services at a fraction of the cost of the active Army...⁹⁵

Senator Russ Feingold

Reality: The U.S. military relies heavily on reserves and national guard forces to perform a variety of missions as part of a totally integrated force. For example, the majority of the Army's support structure is located in the Army Reserve, one-third of all Air Force transport and air-refueling missions are performed by the RC and it is not unusual for a Navy aircraft carrier to have up to 500 reservists in its crew and air wing for a six month deployment.⁹⁶ However, deferring peace operations to the National Guard and Reserve, beyond their normal contribution--for the purpose of easing the burden on the active force--could put a greater strain on the RC and could jeopardize the future viability of the citizen-soldier concept. At present, reserve forces are stretched, creating readiness and retention problems in the RC force, as individuals leave due to dissatisfaction after lengthy deployments or civilian employment considerations.

Additionally, using National Guard and reserves in place of active personnel is more expensive, which could backfire on the readiness of the AC by depriving active units of needed funds for training and quality of life initiatives.

If demands continue, army officials fear that reservists and Guard members will leave the service in large numbers because they are no longer willing to risk civilian careers for such low-priority operations.⁹⁷

Impact on the Reserve Component. The RC, like their active counterparts are already being stretched for peace operations and it is beginning to show at unit, family and civilian employer level. Historically, the reserves were the force of last resort, called in only to reinforce active units as they exhausted themselves in sustained combat during wartime. Over time, this had grown to become a key expectation of reserve members and their civilian employers.

This is no longer the case. Since 1996, over 20,000 reservists have served in Bosnia where they comprise 1,000 of the 7,000 U.S. positions in the NATO peacekeeping force there. Some reservists serve up to 270 days a year away from jobs and families. In the Army, special skills that are concentrated in the reserves—civil affairs, psychological operations, public affairs and transportation movement control—have been particularly hard hit. “We’re just tearing the guts out of people,” says Maj. Gen. Clyde Hennies, who recently retired as the chief of the Alabama National Guard. “Some of his units were having trouble filling their rosters.”⁹⁸

Civilian employers—most of which are non-veterans—are accustomed to the historical use of reserves in a “back-up” role and are less sensitive to the demands of low priority peace missions in parts of the world that they may not care about. Accustomed to losing reservists only for two weeks a year for active training, they have begun reacting to the increased deployments causing many soldiers to fear layoffs. ‘If your company can live without you for six months, they can live without you forever’ says reserve major and manager for a chemical company.⁹⁹

Many people are leaving the RC rather than chance such a deployment.

Conditioned in the Cold War, where their employees were safe from call-up—short of a Desert Storm type situation—many employers have reacted negatively despite laws designed to protect the jobs of citizen soldiers called to active duty:

Returning soldiers have filed more than 1,000 lawsuits charging employers, including the federal government, with failing to meet their legal obligations...Other reservists say they

are glad to serve once but cringe at the prospect of being called again. They fear that their employers' patience may wear thin over missions that seem endless and without clear purpose.¹⁰⁰

Even the US Air Force, the best of the services at reserve component integration, is feeling the strain. Air Force reservists fly one-third of the logistics in the world in support of peace operations and other high OPTEMPO missions, like the "No-Fly Zone" in the Persian Gulf. However, one reserve unit reported its air crews are away from home 110 days a year and Brig. Gen. David S. Sibley has acknowledged that the heavy commitment is beginning to put a strain on other reservists:

I think we are beginning to see a little problem in this area of working our folks too hard...We're doing all this with volunteers, so our challenge is to work very hard with employers and families.¹⁰¹

High Cost of Reserves. The additional use of reserve components could potentially hurt the readiness of the active force that it is intended to help. Ideally, spreading the high operational tempo across the total force—active and reserve—would free up active component personnel for much needed combat training and family time, with a resultant potential for increased readiness, morale and retention. However, bringing reserves on active duty is more expensive than using active forces as reserve forces are only budgeted for two weeks of active duty per year and one weekend a month for pay. Active duty salaries are already bought and paid in the budget and expanding the pay account to accommodate "full-time" reservists puts a further drain on a limited number of resources. By law, when reserves are brought on active duty, the active component pays. An expanded role for the RC in peace operations would be the more expensive option and would necessitate a migration of funds from other critical accounts such as training, quality of life, pay and modernization.

Extra pre-deployment training requirements can further extend active duty service, increasing the pay costs to the active component. For example, leadership training prior to the RC heavy Sinai MFO mission, added an additional two months to the actual deployment. This would not be a problem, if the defense budget was sufficient, but after 13 years of decreased buying power, the modest budget increase proposed for 2000 and the out-years is only sufficient to address the most urgent readiness problems. “More will be needed to meet the challenges of the future,” Army Chief of Staff Dennis Reimer told industry leaders in March of 1999.¹⁰²

The Sinai Example. When the Army became greater involved in peace operations in the post-Cold War period, it attempted to take the burden off the active force by having RC soldiers fill the majority of the positions for twenty-eighth U.S. rotation (1994-1995) of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission. The Sinai mission, a product of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace in 1979, historically had been one of the lowest payoff missions performed by combat units in the US Army. In this operation, battalion sized infantry units manned squad sized outposts in the benign desert environment while their combat maneuver skills atrophied for six-months at both the battalion and company level. Although these six-month rotations require only one combat unit at any given time, the 3 to 4: 1 commitment ratio applies here as well.¹⁰³

Although this RC MFO rotation was considered an operational success, it proved more costly in efficiency, dollars and morale. In fact, the RC rotation has never been repeated, despite the fact that the Army has experienced a 300% mission increase later in the 1990s. In the Sinai, just manning the 446 reserve slots became a major challenge, necessitating the involvement of soldiers from 35 states for a mission that was initially directed to Virginia and

Maryland. Just three weeks prior to the “report-for-duty” date, 39% of the Guard soldiers who volunteered were subsequently unable to report and Maryland and Virginia ended up only contributing only 53% of the eventually fielded force¹⁰⁴

As mentioned earlier, two-months of additional leader training had to be funded to train and test the battalion’s leaders at home station and at the Infantry School. Such training is imbedded in the normal combat battalion due to continuous participation in Army’s leader development program, which includes the Primary Leadership Development Course. Unit cohesion and teamwork are also a byproduct of an active unit’s annual training cycle. The biggest expense, however, was in salaries for those 446 former part-timers to come onto active duty for such an extended period. Salaries for reservists, normally budgeted for one weekend a month and two weeks of active duty a year created an unfinanced requirement of up to eight months of full-time pay for some soldiers. Such a well intentioned use of reserves actually turned into a position to hurt readiness, as the funds that are used by active units to train were migrated to pay for training and operations for more expensive RC soldiers.

The impact on the reserve components was also great. In the Sinai, there was a 36% decrease in reserve soldiers who said they would volunteer again and, more significantly, a 26% decrease in those that intended to remain in the reserves. The RC can hardly afford to exacerbate normal attrition through lengthy and often boring commitments, like the Sinai, where “morale dropped considerably over the duration of the deployment.”¹⁰⁵ Such trends continue to this day. The Army Reserve, which has provided 16,000 people for the peace enforcement in Bosnia, failed to meet it’s recruiting goal by one-third in the first quarter of fiscal year 1999.¹⁰⁶

Opportunity Knocks in 1999. The planned use of a national guard division, as the command and control headquarters for U.S. forces in Bosnia in the year 2000, has provided a rare opportunity for reserves to be used selectively and responsibly to alleviate the high OPTEMPO in the active force, without hurting readiness. By using the headquarters of the 49th Division, Texas National Guard, will be more expensive than using an AC unit—for the aforementioned reasons—the active force has generated sufficient pay savings to cover the pre-deployment training due a poor recruiting year in 1999.¹⁰⁷ By not having to pay the salaries of 5,000 soldiers in the active force, the Army can easily afford to pay the two hundred RC soldiers without robbing other accounts that might impact on combat units.

Army Chief of Staff Dennis Reimer made this decision in order to reduce AC OPTEMPO and to limit the negative impact on the readiness of high priority combat forces which may be needed to respond to other threats around the world. “The decision also reflects the CSA’s confidence in the RC’s ability to perform critical missions for the Army—and his vision of “One Team, One Fight, One Future,” stated a spokesperson. Costs were minimized by having the Guard provide only the headquarters and not the troop units, as was the case in the Sinai, a decision that not only saves dollars but minimizes the impact on civilian employers and Guard families.

It must be noted that it is a rare circumstance where a recruiting shortfall coincides with a major peace operations deployment. Ideally, the Army would be able to recruit to its full authorization and the issue of the impact on civilian employers and reserve families still remains. The viability of the Total Force must be maintained and stretching and exhausting the RC for active component is not prudent over the long-term. Also, allowing AC readiness and quality of

life to suffer, just to utilize a more expensive reserve component is not a sustainable strategy.

Gen. Reimer cautioned the Army and industry leaders that, “we can’t just transfer OPTEMPO problems to Guard and Reserves—it’s not fair--the key is predictability.”¹⁰⁸

Myth 4: The troops like doing peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, it’s the strong economy that is causing the military’s retention problems.

“Policymakers may find themselves surprised at the willingness of many U.S. military personnel to carry out well-conceived missions that make a meaningful difference in peoples’ lives overseas. While it is true that many U.S. military officers would prefer not to participate in humanitarian operations, it is also true that the Army’s highest reenlistment rates come from units that have recently been deployed to Bosnia.”¹⁰⁹

O’Hanlon and Solarz

Reality: U.S. military personnel have always executed peace operations professionally-- as they perform all their missions--and, like most Americans, enjoy lending a helping hand to those in need. However, that does not mean that they prefer spending a career on multiple deployments—not focused on warfighting--at the expense of a reasonable family life. While the military lifestyle is unique enough to compete favorably with the civilian sector, even in a robust economy, when faced with sustained financial hardships and extended time away from home, many married servicemen and women are feeling an greater responsibility to their families. It is interesting to note that the servicemember usually makes the initial decision to join the military while the spouse tends to make the decision to reenlist. The good economy only removes much of the risk and uncertainty and eases the transition into the civilian world.

I do not enjoy peacekeeping. It’s far too political. I didn’t join the Army to be a peacekeeper.¹¹⁰

Resigning career officer

Deployments to far-off ‘peacekeeping’ missions are another reason for mid-career attrition. With all of the services shorthanded, assignments to these hardship missions

are far more frequent than in the past. Moreover, to soldiers who have been trained to fight, many of these peacekeeping missions seem pointless.¹¹¹

Lucian Truscott

Some say the military can't compete with the high salaries being paid during these robust economic times. Not so, says Nunamaker, 'No amount of money will ever determine whether I stay or go.'¹¹²

Lt (j.g.) Ted Nunamaker

Family separation has long been known to be the primary reason that married soldiers give for not remaining in the Army.¹¹³

Vernez and Zellman

A considerable number of young men indicated they did not wish to serve as peacekeepers in foreign countries. . . . Some suggested that recent military ventures were motivated by the interests of national leaders—Congress or the President—but were not the national interest. They objected to being put in jeopardy to fight someone else's battles.¹¹⁴

Washington Post

The military cares more about Bosnian families than they do about my family.

Unidentified soldier

The mistake in the 1990s of viewing the military as an unlimited resource, while simultaneously cutting defense budgets and force structure has raised the operational tempo of the Department of Defense to unprecedented levels. Missions, currently up 300% for the Army and 400% for the Air Force, are being performed by a force that has been reduced one-third to provide America with a peace dividend and a budget surplus. In the first half of the decade, it seemed that the only requirement for the U.S. military to get involved was that some group be in need and the international community or the media call for "leadership by the world's sole remaining superpower."

This unbridled approach led to five new peace operations in the first half of the 1990s and placed an unprecedented strain on service personnel and their families. Although military families

are accustomed to certain hardships and separation, as a matter of course, the pace has become unbearable to many. For example, a senior non-commissioned officer with 13 years invested into a military career and only seven years away from retirement is departing after having served in the Sinai, Bosnia, Macedonia and the Gulf, all in the 1990s.

‘With all these pockets of instability in the world, is it our responsibility to be big brother every time there is a problem,’ he asks...Unfortunately, he thinks, the answer is yes. He just doesn’t want to be the one doing it anymore.¹¹⁵

Cases like this are becoming more common, particularly among servicemembers with families. The Army, which does the heavy lifting on peacekeeping and peace enforcement, finds that 64% of its force is married. At the mid-career level, as the case of the sergeant first class mentioned above, the percentage is much higher. General Reimer, the Army Chief of Staff, shared his concern in this testimony before Congress:

Brave, selfless soldiers will accomplish all assigned tasks, but if they see the military profession as incompatible with a reasonably stable family life, then the future of the Army is in serious jeopardy.¹¹⁶

“The key to retaining outstanding soldiers is the spouse,” testified Roy Thomas, the Command Sergeant Major of an Infantry Brigade at Ft Hood.¹¹⁷ General Reimer agrees:

Excessive time away from home is often cited by quality professionals as the main reason for their decisions to leave the military...It is still common to find soldiers that have gone 140, 160 or 190 days during the past year. It is not uncommon for spouses to believe they have done their part. All our research shows the views of the spouse to be the most important factor in a soldier’s decision to stay in the Army.¹¹⁸

Military spouses, once accustomed to handling short separations to local training areas with an occasional prolonged separation, are finding the operational tempo to be too high to sustain a full twenty-year career. It is not unusual for a soldier or airmen who enjoyed his or her peacekeeping experience to leave the service upon the input of the spouse. Separations are not

limited to the actual time deployed but include the training preparation prior to departure and the intense training, to restore combat skills, once the unit returns from a peace operation. Many military families are not willing to absorb the repetitive financial hardships and separations commensurate with field training or deployed operations.¹¹⁹ General Reimer notes:

The bottom line is that most (soldiers) are proud to serve, and many would like to continue to serve, but can not afford to because of the family sacrifices required. If we provide an environment that is safe, predictable, enriching, and fulfilling to the family, we keep the soldier. They are our future.¹²⁰

This helps to explain the confusing signals that came out of the recent experience in Bosnia and Haiti where morale was high and retention rates actually improved in some units. Morale was high because the U.S. military has a high quality force which takes pride in performing a challenging, meaningful real-world mission. Retention improved initially because military families are accustomed to some separation and one long deployment was deemed acceptable to most families. However, as the military prepares to enter its fifth year in Bosnia, the numerous deployments are taking their toll. For example, as early as May 1998, one-third of the 1st Infantry Division force conducting the six-month peacekeeping deployment in Macedonia had also served in Bosnia. Currently it also has ground maneuver units is on duty in Kosovo.

This problem is not unique to the Army. The U.S. Air Force, another key contributor to peace operations—is experiencing a problem in retaining mid-career pilots and attracting new recruits. In 1999, the Air Force, for the time ever, began having to engage in paid advertising to attract young people into its force. Despite unprecedented financial incentives to retain pilots, the number of pilots that took advantage of such incentives plummeted from 81 to 26 percent. This has resulted in an 800 pilot shortage in 1998 compared with a shortage of 41 in 1997 after

a surplus of 409 in 1996. The two reasons pilots give for declining the bonus is not the lure of the airlines but “high operational tempo and poor quality of life.”¹²¹

It’s not the economy stupid.

‘Flying an F-16 as an Air Force pilot in Europe may be more rewarding and challenging than flying for a private airline,’ Jehn said. As a result, although (the Pentagon) may need to pay its pilots more than it does today, it probably does not need to match the salaries that civilian airlines offer.¹²²

Too much is made of the robust economy, specifically the attractiveness of the airlines to Air Force pilots. Pilots rarely cite such reasons when they are confronted with the decision to leave the service. First, military flying—particularly combat aircraft—is a unique experience that could not be replicated anywhere, especially in the airlines. “The future I see is more deployments, more time away from home,” the Baltimore Sun quoted a 37 year-old pilot saying. “I just want to spend more time with my family.”¹²³ During Vietnam 70 percent of the pilots were single, today 70 percent are married and people yearn for “the normality of civilian life.”¹²⁴

The airline argument really breaks down when one examines the case of Army attack helicopter pilots. The Apache helicopter, a combat aircraft, with no transferable civilian skills has the highest attrition rate among Army pilots. The problem is so bad that for the first time in history, the Army is participating in a bonus program designed to give each warrant officer pilot an additional \$12,000 a year to remain in the Army. However, with three attack battalions in Korea and four in Europe, the Army does not have enough “state-side” units to guarantee a normal two to three year assignment in the U.S., as part of its assignment rotation.

Surveys indicate that the main reasons for the early departures relate to greater strains being placed on troops as a result of a decade of force reductions and a rising number of U.S. military operations abroad. Moreover, the continued strength of the U.S. economy has increased the availability and attraction of civilian job opportunities.¹²⁵

It has become apparent to senior leaders that a major way to decrease military attrition is to decrease the operational tempo. President Clinton's decision to remove the force from the Persian Gulf in the spring of 1998 was to "reduce the strain of these deployments."¹²⁶ Additionally, the Army Chief of Staff has instituted a policy of providing soldiers with one month at home for every month deployed. However, the best way to lower OPTEMPO is to limit the suite of potential situations where the U.S. military is called upon as the "agency of choice" solely because of its capabilities and history of success. Purely humanitarian operations should be left to humanitarian organizations. The fact that such organizations lack the inclination or the funding to undertake such operations should not automatically default the problem to a military organization simply because it is deployable and competent. They should be funded to perform their specific function and the military preserved to execute its portion of the National Security Strategy—the National Military Strategy.

People. A very small percentage of the future defense budget has been programmed for peace operations or humanitarian assistance.¹²⁷ The primary purpose of the programmed budget increase is to enhance personnel programs (and turnaround the downward spiral in modernization). Military pay now lags 13.5% behind the civilian sector of the economy as a result of lagging pay raises in the 1990s to pay for high OPTEMPO operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti and the Persian Gulf. This, along with family separation, raises another issue of providing a "living wage" for military families where currently 12,000 families are living on food stamps.

Deferring pay raises to create funds have led to recruiting and retention problems throughout the force that raise serious questions as to whether the Department of Defense can be manned at appropriate levels to support the military component of the NSS, the National Military Strategy. For example, in 1998, the Navy only enlisted 88% of the sailors it needed, coming up 7,000 short. In the first quarter of FY 99, the Army needed 12,420 men and women, but could muster only 10,075. Unofficial estimates indicate that the total for the year could be as high as 10,000 short.¹²⁸ The Air Force also came up short and is on its way to its first recruiting shortfall in 20 years. Both the Army and the Navy have lowered quality standards to 90% high school graduates—the most allowed by the Department of Defense.

In one effort to address the critical personnel shortages, DoD is earmarking a large portion of the increase for military pay and retirement benefits. In an effort to close the pay gap that developed in the 1990's, FY 2000 will mark the largest annual raise since 1982 followed by substantial increases in the out years through 2005. The retirement system is also being increased back to its pre-1986 level of fifty percent retirement after twenty years of service.

Lowering Quality. As the quality of the individuals across the American military declines to meet the necessary manning requirements, special implications arise with regard to humanitarian and peace operations. These missions are more complex and often require a greater degree of cultural sensitivity, self-discipline, intelligence and political or diplomatic situational awareness. In the post-Cold War world, the requirement for quality has gone up, while quality of the Armed Forces is trending down.

Americans feel great pride when its forces go abroad and conduct a successful peace operation; however, failures represent national embarrassment on an international stage. What

may have been a good idea in Bosnia in 1995, with a higher quality force, may not pass muster with the turn of the century force consisting of 90% or less of high school graduates. Although a high school diploma is not the necessary mark of success in the military, historically the services have found that high school graduates demonstrate a desire to succeed and statistically perform better and experience less problems in their first term of enlistment.

The emphasis on quality, as the force continues to decline, can not be overstated. Even the Canadian Army—one of the finest in the world during the Cold War—experienced a case of indiscipline in Somalia where members of its peacekeeping contingent tortured and killed a local man. The incident created an international incident that led to the nation’s only parachute regiment to be permanently disbanded.

More recently, in Sierra Leon, UN human rights monitors charged that the regional peacekeepers had summarily executed dozens of civilians and conducted “numerous incidents of ill treatment.”¹²⁹ Filed with the Secretary General of the UN, the report stated that the monitoring group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG) had engaged in executions of patients, including children, at a hospital on Jan 12, 1999 and conducted punishments to indigenous personnel which included, “whipping, beating, varying types of public humiliation, and being bound extremely tightly.”¹³⁰ Previously, in June 1998, the Secretary General had commended the same peacekeepers for helping to restore order to many parts of the country.

As the overall quality of the force continues to decline, so will the quality of the commanders making the decisions. The fact that the U.S. was successful in Bosnia may not be germane to future complex peacekeeping situations. The same goes for the level of discipline they are able

to demand and maintain within their units. As the quality of the force goes down, cases of indiscipline are sure to increase. Before America commits a force to a complex political and diplomatic situation, we should assess the current state of the force and its capability to work in demanding and decentralized environment. We may find the military of the 21st century is no longer as well suited for such operations. It is unlikely that the hollow Army of the 1970s could have handled it.

The Personnel Train Wreck. As large number of deployments and low pay and retirement benefits compel many military veterans to leave service, another problem is emerging into what could best be described as a personnel train wreck. Young people today are just not showing the propensity for military service that preceding generations had. As fewer young Americans are influenced by relatives that served in World War II, the publicity of many of the advantages of military service is no longer there within communities and families. Also, more young adults are going on directly to college where federal financial aid is plentiful and monies are not tied to national service. Finally, as military families feel the continued burden of frequent deployments, fewer young people are compelled to follow in their parents' footsteps as the military slowly loses a significant source of its man power—second generation military members.

Nothing sums up the impending personnel crisis better than the following state report of James Freeman in the *USA Today*:

You may get a little more discouraged when you see the Pentagon's data on attitudes about military service. Every year, the Defense Department polls 10,000 Americans aged 16-24 about their desire to serve on active duty. It's called the Youth Attitude Tracking Survey, or YATS. And since the Gulf War the YATS shows a gradual but very definite trend - fewer and fewer young Americans are attracted to military service. In fact, it's becoming a real problem.

Recruitment is getting tougher just as more and more quality troops are declining to re-enlist. In his 1999 annual report to Congress, Defense Secretary Cohen says that many of the most skilled members of the Navy and Air Force “are leaving at higher than normal rates.” He adds “retention is increasingly challenging.”¹³¹

Myth 5: The UN is the organization of choice within the world community to undertake future peace operations. They have been involved in global peacekeeping for over 50 years and have the legitimacy and experience to meet future challenges.

Reality: The United Nations is incapable—virtually by design—of commanding and controlling large and complex “second-generation” forces for peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Although Security Council resolutions remain helpful in building consensus and adding legitimacy to such efforts, such operations are best undertaken unilaterally or by “coalitions of the willing,” comprised of selected countries within established military alliances, like NATO.

When the Cold War ended, the nature and magnitude of United Nations peace operations took a turn toward the large and complex. The first-generation or traditional peacekeeping that the world experienced prior to 1989 was benign compared to its younger brother that evolved in the post-Cold War era. Always within the shadow of the superpower confrontation and with each operation unanimously approved by the Security Council, traditional peacekeepers were only allowed to operate in areas that were deemed acceptable by both the Soviet Union and the West, in addition to the belligerent parties.¹³² John Hillen observes in his excellent book entitled, *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations:*

To be approved by the Security Council during this time of Cold War friction, a peacekeeping mission had to be unambitious enough in its military characteristics and

goals to fit below the threshold of tension on the Security Council. A large military mission with ambitious objectives did not stand much of a chance of approval... Thus it was sine qua non that a peacekeeping mission enjoy the full support of the Security Council, and the superpowers in particular to be successful.¹³³

It was this Cold War safety net that never allowed traditional peacekeeping to be stressed enough to determine its viability as a universal doctrine. When applied to the post-Cold War period, the model simply did not stand up and a second-generation version of peacekeeping needed to be developed. Hillen describes the inherent flaw in traditional peacekeeping:

A paradox of traditional peacekeeping missions was that their environments combined a physical danger from the heavily armed and aggressive belligerents with an assumption that these factions would cooperate with the UN force's wishes. The potential bellicosity of the environment made these missions unsuited for loosely organized teams of unarmed observers. However, the passive nature of the UN force's actions and the reliance on the cooperation of belligerents meant that a huge and aggressive collective security force was unsuited (and most often politically unattainable) for the mission.¹³⁴

The post-Cold War consensus on the Security Council coupled with several UN successes in the early 1990s—including the successful enforcement of the resolution on the Gulf War—led many, including the UN Secretary General, to envision a dominant and expansionary role for the UN in policing the world.¹³⁵ More significantly, individual nations were well on their way to cashing in on their own peace dividends and were quite content with letting the world body deal with the new environment of intrastate conflicts. Unfortunately, traditional peacekeeping methods and force sizing were unsuitable for these new challenges, which were inherently more dangerous and complex. The increased danger necessitated the need for larger and more robust military forces. While the requirement now existed for military forces to get larger, the military's role actually diminished from that of lead agency—in traditional peacekeeping—to just

one of many actors—humanitarian, economic and diplomatic—as the focus of the UN turned to nation building.

A Track Record of Incompetence. The UN was simply not up to the task of managing such large-scale second-generation peacekeeping operations. A report to the General Assembly by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OSIS) found that from 1992 to 1995:

The Organization did not have the necessary human resources and expertise to provide sufficient logistical and administrative support to peacekeeping missions (which involved more than 80,000 military and civilian peacekeepers and a budget in excess of \$5.3 billion).¹³⁶

This problem resulted from inadequate consultation from the headquarters and expertise in the field resulting in improper procurement practices resulting in \$7.1 million in legal fees and interest for arbitrated disputes. Unclear contract terms resulted in over \$52 million in claims against the UN, of which half the cases were decided in court against the world body in favor of the contractor plaintiff. In one case, a peacekeeping mission paid \$4 million for substandard food rations and services, but since the information provided the headquarters was neither complete nor sent in a timely manner, no formal notice of non-compliance was ever filed with the contractor. Examples of other problems were encountered in the distribution of fuel, where a UN procurement officer failed to note on the contract the minimum amount of delivered fuel (7,921 gallons) per trip in petroleum tankers. Without this provision the contractor used partially filled tankers (between 500 and 1500 gallons), causing the UN to incur \$1.3 million in additional trip expenses. In another case, the UN had to pay for over a million dollars in damages to helicopters caused by unlicensed or unqualified drivers.

The UN survived these years only by the efforts of military personnel from the member nations who pitched in and performed these critical functions, but not without its problems. The OSIS report states:

Under those circumstances, key contract administration functions in the field in many cases had to be entrusted to military personnel provided by the Member States. Those personnel, although competent in their respective functions, were not familiar with the Organization's procurement and contract management procedures. They also could not be held accountable for their actions by the Organization.¹³⁷

Peace Enforcement. For the first time in history, the UN began dealing with the issue of enforcing the peace, in addition to keeping it.¹³⁸ Unfortunately, they began deploying such forces with this mandate before they adequately dealt with the distinctions between Chapter VI (peacekeeping) and Chapter VII (peace enforcement) provisions. Hillen points out that in Bosnia, “no enforcement actions were carried out by UNPROFOR forces until May 1995, over three years into the mission.”¹³⁹ One of the UNPROFOR commanders, operating under this mandate felt “that his UN force was neither structured for, nor in his mind, authorized to use coercive force to create an atmosphere in which his UN force could succeed.”¹⁴⁰

It is not difficult to see why UNPROFOR had so much difficulty implementing its peace enforcement mandate. In his strategic study of UN peace operations, Hillen notes that the “United Nations by 1996, had not achieved, on the ground, a clear divide between peacekeeping/Chapter VI and peace enforcement/Chapter VII missions.”¹⁴¹ In fact, the UN had operated in Bosnia for three years promising safe havens and services requiring enforcement, while doing little in its institutional mindset to move beyond the traditional peacekeeping. When a U.S. Army commander—enroute to Bosnia as part of NATO's implementation force (IFOR)—asked a British veteran of the UNPROFOR operation why he

had allowed his heavily armed convoy to be held up for 24 hours by two lightly armed Serb paramilitaries, he responded, “if we had provoked a fight, we would have had to take off our blue berets. We would have prevailed, but what happens later to the lone, unarmed laundry truck.” Such traditional thinking of passive military operations focused only on self protection led to the demise of UNPROFOR and gave rise to the robust peace enforcement operation undertaken by NATO in Bosnia during the post-Dayton period.

While it appears that the UN could overcome the aforementioned mistakes over time and adapt to the enforcement needs of second-generation peacekeeping, the issue of interoperability and command and control are unlikely to be overcome. Although more nations now contribute to UN peace operations than ever and the political consensus that this community represents is formidable, the UN is just not capable of managing such large and complex forces. Mats

Berdal notes:

The UN machinery for organizing and sustaining peacekeeping missions has not changed fundamentally since the revival of UN field operations in 1988. Indeed the case of the former Yugoslavia has shown that the management of field operations continues to rely heavily on improvisation, ad hoc solutions, and the cultivation of close relationships among the members of the UN Departments.¹⁴²

Although a concerted effort has been made to improve the UN’s ability to manage peace operations, many that have called for an expanded role have resigned themselves to the limits of the institution:

The means to plan, support, and command peacekeeping, let alone enforcement, is scarcely greater now than during the Cold War. Modest progress in establishing a situation room in New York and some consolidation in the UN administrative services are hardly sufficient to make the militaries of the major or middle powers feel at ease about placing the UN in charge of combat missions.¹⁴³

The bottom line is that nations and alliances do it better where potential interoperability and command and control problems are addressed in training and their solutions codified into standard operating procedures. Adam Roberts observed that:

Military actions require extremely close coordination between intelligence gathering and operations, a smoothly functioning decision-making machine and forces with some experience of working together to perform dangerous and complex tasks. These things are more likely to be achieved through existing national armed forces, alliances, and military relationships, than they are within the structure of a UN command.¹⁴⁴

Hillen agrees, “Professor Roberts’ observations were correct: the UN simply has not had the institutional competence to manage military forces engaged in what he labels ‘dangerous and complex tasks.’”¹⁴⁵

The problem is not just mechanical but relates to the fundamentals of the UN’s existence. The United Nations is not a world legislature with the sovereignty, governmental authority and legitimacy of a nation state. It does not have a standing Army and the ability to recruit, organize and train forces—and that is the way its members desire it. As Hillen points out in the conclusion of his book,

The existing ‘structure of a UN command’ has shown over the years that it could accommodate some military operations that are managed through the United Nations proper. In the main, these operations were small and simple, as they were kept limited by the constraints and restrictions inherent to a multinational organization such as the United Nations.¹⁴⁶

If Not the UN, Then Whom? There was a great expectation, particularly before the Kosovo crisis, that NATO would take on much of the worldwide burden of future peace operations, not only within Europe but extra-regionally, as well. Not only would the alliance demonstrate the viability of regional organizations dealing with regional problems, many envisaged NATO becoming a Trans-Atlantic instrument for dealing with common security concerns—regardless of

location--when any member's interests were at stake. Such thinking, advanced by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NATO commander General John Shalikashvili at Harvard in April of 1999, literally could mean anywhere in the world. For instance, he suggested that should the U.S. and Europe find it in their common interest to intervene militarily in the Persian Gulf to ensure oil flow, NATO should be the mechanism for the intervention. He even went so far as to say that the NATO nations should agree in advance and that UN approval of a NATO intervention in a regional or "out of region" area is not necessary.

However, after Kosovo, it is unlikely that NATO will develop rapidly as a Trans-Atlantic, extra-regional peacekeeping organization. In fact, Kosovo could serve as a reality check and appetite suppressant much like Somalia did for the United States, earlier in the decade. First, NATO will be tied up in the Balkans for at least the next ten years, making any simultaneous operation a hard sell for nations that guard their peace dividend even more seriously than the U.S.¹⁴⁷ Even Kosovo did not represent a full commitment on the part of the Europeans, as the United States underwrote 90 percent of the costs and flew 75 percent of the aircraft missions. Only one-third of the NATO countries offered to take on refugees, although the operation was ostensibly done on behalf of the welfare of the Kosovar Albanians on humanitarian grounds.

Second, NATO—a consensus organization where one veto by any one of 19 members can kill an initiative—will not go blindly into another Kosovo situation. After being reassured by the United States and Britain that the bombing campaign would be short—a form of coercive diplomacy--many countries did not object, despite serious misgivings. Greece, for example, did not veto despite the fact that 95% of the people were against airstrikes. The new countries in NATO—Hungary, Poland, and Czech, on the sidelines this one--will have veto authority on

future operations. In Kosovo, only Poland—the most distant geographically—strongly supported the NATO action with Hungary and Czech very concerned about the actions in their neighborhood. Virtually every nation exceeded its comfort level on the operation and it will be difficult to get the group together for such an ambitious project again.¹⁴⁸

Third, the benefits of using the alliance in Kosovo did not outweigh the costs, which will tempt the U.S. and other major powers to seek better solutions in the future, like “coalitions of the willing.” NATO, while it provided a formidable international political presence in isolating a third-rate European power, also experienced its problems as it expended exceptional levels of organization energy keeping political consensus and appeasing all the members. In the future, selective NATO major powers—US, France, Britain, and possibly Germany—can form coalitions of the willing and still use the common procedures and equipment that have long been the strength of the NATO military component. Such selective groups are more likely to hold together during crisis and be more willing to delegate the military portion of the effort to the military commander.

In short term, there may be an attempt to return to UN peacekeeping as a reaction to Kosovo, however, the systemic problems with the UN’s inability to deal with the complexities of second generation peacekeeping have not improved and are unlikely to be accomplished short of a major reorganization and restructuring. There is virtually no support among the members for such a radical action, particularly among the permanent members of the Security Council. NATO will be tied down with the Balkans and give up its extra-regional peacekeeping ambitions, at least temporarily. The long-term solution will be coalitions of the willing, most often consisting of the NATO major powers and only when the interests of all the powers are

concerned. For the European powers, their out of area operations will most likely will remain within the “NATO perimeter,” while the U.S. will focus more towards the Pacific and Asia.¹⁴⁹

Given the UN’s inability to deal with second-generation peacekeeping and NATO’s difficult and costly intervention in Kosovo, in the main, there will be little response from the world community to get involved in intrastate conflicts and civil wars, even where ethnic cleansing and genocide are involved, like Rwanda. It is pretty much up to regional organizations to deal with the early 21st Century, which is not promising, as only the Europeans seem capable of dealing with their internal regional problems.

Conclusion. As America closes out its “Peacekeeping Decade” and continues to learn from this unprecedented venture in unbridled peace operations, several myths have endured. The United States is not queued up, as many think, to undertake an ambitious peace operations and humanitarian agenda. That could have been an option, following the Cold War, but instead opted for a peace dividend instead—worth \$750b. At 2.9% GDP, America has to be very selective in the causes it underwrites for only a finite number of operations can be undertaken at this funding level. Even if additional monies could be budgeted, it is doubtful that the military could recruit sufficient numbers to fill the ranks, as young people today opt to look elsewhere. A recession could improve the quantity but what does that portend about the quality of people that would enter the military?

With Kosovo and Bosnia, the future of peace operations is fairly predictable, at least for the next ten years; America will be taking an appetite suppressant from new peace operations in the first decade of the new millennium. The myth on accepting casualties will unnecessarily extend ongoing operations as the premium on force protection will slow progress in Bosnia and

Kosovo. The Guard and reserves will continue to contribute at the same high OPTEMPO as the active component, hurting their retention of personnel and raising the overall costs of peace operations. The myth that servicemembers like peace operations will further contribute to a personnel and readiness crisis as both active and RC military people leave the service in droves. Finally, the myth that the UN can do effective peacekeeping will probably continue into the next century, despite strong evidence to the contrary. After ten years, it is obvious that lessons must only be learned but also absorbed.

¹ There were no vetoes cast in the Security Council from mid-1990 to mid-1993. From 1945-90, there were 234 total vetoes. See Adam Roberts, "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," in *Managing Global Chaos*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 297.

² "Peace operations" is a broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. Peacekeeping operations are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Peace enforcement involves the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Department of Defense, *DOD Dictionary* (Washington: GPO, 1994, updated through April 1997), 401-402.

³ These six major peace operations were Operation Provide Comfort in relief of the Kurds in Northern Iraq; Operation Restore Hope in Somalia; Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti; Operation Able Sentry in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; Operation Joint Endeavor (later Operation Joint Guard) in Bosnia, and the MFO mission in the Sinai, a product of the Camp David Agreement. The MFO mission is the only mission that existed prior to 1990.

⁴ Steven Komarow, "For Military, Bosnia has Become a Blessing," *USA Today*, December 22, 1997, 14A.

⁵ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995), 16. Not to be confused with the most recent version published in October 1998 and referred to throughout this paper as 1998 NSS or current NSS.

⁶ Komarow, 14A.

⁷ David Callahan, *Unwinnable Wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997), 45.

⁸ Michael E. O'Hanlon and Stephan J. Solarz, "Deciding When To Go?," *Washington Post*, Feb 7, 1999, B1.

⁹ Walter Isaacson, "Madeleine's War," *Time*, May 17, 1999.

¹⁰ Department of Defense, *National Budget Estimates for FY 1999* (Washington: GPO, March 1998), Table 7-7.

¹¹ Even if Congress increased the defense budget in an attempt to "buy back" some force structure to bring the force in line with the Clinton Administration's Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, it is unlikely the force could be manned without a draft. The active component of the U.S. Army could not fill its ranks in the first quarter of FY 1999 and could end the year over 7,000 soldiers short. The Army Reserve is encountering similar problems and could fail to fill 9,500 spaces for fiscal year 1999. The Navy had similar problems in FY 1998 and was still short 11,000 sailors halfway through FY 1999. The problem of expanded roles and missions can no longer be fixed by simply expanding "spaces" but now "faces" become a limitation as well.

¹² The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1998) [hereafter, 1998 NSS].

¹³ Harry Summers, "The Hill's Non-Feasance," *Washington Times*, Feb 24, 1999, 15.

¹⁴ Senate Committee on Appropriations, *FY2000 Budget*, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 11 May, 1999.

¹⁵ Defense Press Service, "Cohen: U.S. Stretching Smaller Military Forces Too Far," May 13, 1999. From world wide web at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/#News>.

¹⁶ Callahan, 45.

¹⁷ Senate Armed Services Committee, *Status of U.S. Military Forces*, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., September 29, 1998, 9.

¹⁸ Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Statement of Robert B. Zoellick, to the Committee on the Budget of the US Senate," Feb 24, 1999. Statement available on the World Wide Web at <http://www.csis.org/hill/ts990224.html> [hereafter, Zoellick, CSIS].

¹⁹ For current definitions of "vital" and "important" national interests, see 1998 NSS, 5.

²⁰ *Ibid*, p. iv.

²¹ Johnathan S. Landay, "America Unsettled Over Global Role," *The Christian Science Monitor*, Feb 18, 1999, 1.

²² Kay Bailey Hutchison, "U.S. Doesn't Belong In Kosovo," *USA Today*, February 24, 1999.

²³ Zoellick, CSIS.

²⁴ Earlier I mentioned that a 5% GDP investment would be required for a national security policy based on an ambitious peace operations and humanitarian agenda. Zoellick accounts for 3.8% of that 5% here by just bringing us back to a readiness (includes modernization) standard to perform a strategy based on the current policy of selective peacekeeping articulated in PDD-25 and the current NSS. To implement a less-selective peacekeeping doctrine based on being able to end violence or addressing America's secondary interests, as O'Hanlon and Callahan suggest, would take roughly another 1% GDP. There would be a requirement to buy back some force structure for peace and humanitarian operations plus the cost of sustaining those forces in the field.

²⁵ Department of State, *The Clinton Administration Policy on Multilateral Operations* (Washington: U.S. Department of State Publication 10161, May 1994 [hereafter, PDD-25].

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

²⁷ The next National Military Strategy is currently under development. It is top-driven by the most recent version of the NSS, released in October 1998. The new focus on homeland defense and global economy are sure to be included in the next draft of the NMS. There will be a large price tag associated with these initiatives that sure to influence the defense debate in a balance budget environment.

²⁸ Association of the United States Army, "Defense Budget Increases: Modernization Needs More Funds," *AUSA News* 21 (1999): 2.

²⁹ Not all of this money comes out of the defense budget. The majority is for the protection of embassies and other buildings and people from conventional weapons, like truck and car bombs. However, given the Balanced Budget Agreement of 1997, the impact is still significant as all increases in federal funding must be offset by decreases elsewhere in the budget or taxes must be raised. The budget on counter terrorism doubled from 1998 to 1999 and the 2000 budget is the largest expenditure ever.

³⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, *The Weapons Proliferation Threat* (Washington: CIA, March 1995), 2.

³¹ John Donnelly, "NMD Cost Estimate Up 30 Percent Since Last Week," *Defense Week*, January 19, 1999, 1.

³² Department of Defense, Press Briefing, 20 Jan 99.

³³ The Balance Budget Agreement (BBA) of 1997 requires that defense spending increases be paid for by tax increases or a corresponding decrease in domestic spending. For practical purposes, defense has become a zero sum game.

³⁴ Jim Garamone, "DOD Needs More Base Cuts, White House Official Says," *Defense Press Service*, January 14, 1999.

³⁵ Senate, 99?

³⁶ Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Hearing on Military Confirmations*, 106th Cong., 1st sess., June 8, 1999.

³⁷ Earnest Blazer, *Washington Times*, January 25-31, 1999, 18.

³⁸ Serge Schmemmann, "Clinton's Plan To Send Troops To Kosovo Revives Troubling Issue of US Role In Crisis," *New York Times*, February 15, 1999.

³⁹ Stephen S. Rosenfield, "An Act of War . . .," *Washington Post*, February 26, 1999, p 27.

⁴⁰ Colonel P.T. Pope, paper from the National War College Class of 1998 (unpublished).

⁴¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington: CJCS, undated), 4.

⁴² Even units performing peace operations are often still part of existing warplans despite the fact that their combat skills have atrophied as time is spent away from combat training. When units are committed to peace operations, the senior military leaders that oversee our ability to execute the NMS and its supporting warplans take a calculated risk.

⁴³ Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Hearing on Military Confirmations*, 106th Cong., 1st sess., June 8, 1999.

⁴⁴ Maj. Gen. David L. Grange and Colonel Benton H. Borum, "The Readiness Factor," *Armed Forces Journal* (April, 1977): 22.

⁴⁵ 1998 NSS, 5.

⁴⁶ White House press release, "Remarks by the President on Foreign Policy," February 26, 1999.

⁴⁷ Charles Krauthammer, "...We Don't Need To Inflict," *Washington Post*, February 26, 1999, 27.

⁴⁸ Department of Defense, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, April, 1997): 1.

⁴⁹ Robert Art cited in Barry R. Posen and Andrew R. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," in *America's Strategic Choices*, ed. Micheal E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 14.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 2, Table I.

⁵³ Lt. Gen. Bernard E. Trainor, "The Winners and Losers in the Balkan War," *Boston Globe*, June 11, 1999, A31.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, A31.

⁵⁵ Richard Holbrooke, *To End A War* (New York: Random House, 1998), 328.

⁵⁶ Benjamin C. Schwartz, *Casualties, Public Opinion and U.S. Military Intervention: Implications for U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1994), ix.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 12. This is significant, given that the fact the United States possessed an impressive arsenal of atomic weapons at this time.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 12-13.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 17-20.

⁶² Eric V. Larsen, *Casualties and Consensus* (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, 1996), 50.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 50-51.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 245.

⁶⁵ The U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon following the bombing of the U.S. Marine Barracks there is another rare example where we did withdraw rather than escalate to win.

⁶⁶ Mark Bowden, "Somalia Revisited," *Washington Times*, November 24, 1997.

⁶⁷ Mark Bowden, "Death of 18 U.S. Troops Haunts American View on Peacekeeping," *Washington Times*, January 22, 1998.

⁶⁸ See Colonel Michael Alvis, "Dying for Peace: Understanding the Role of Casualties in US Peace Operations," *AUSA Institute of Landware Landpower Essay Series*, January 1999.

⁶⁹ Earnest Blazer, "Confused by Success," *Washington Times*, December 1997, A7.

⁷⁰ Dana Priest, "Fear of Casualties Drives Bosnia Debate," *The Washington Post*, December 2, 1995, A1.

⁷¹ Ibid., A1.

⁷² Another major factor attributed to bringing the Serbs to the table in late 1995 is the Croatian successful counteroffensive in the Krajina earlier that year.

⁷³ Earnest Blazar, "Packaging Forces," *Washington Times*, June 29, 1998, A9.

⁷⁴ Ibid., A9.

⁷⁵ R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Fine-Tunes Focus of Macedonian Mission," *The Washington Post*, April 1, 1998, A24.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 24.

⁷⁷ PDD-25, 4. Chapter VI refers to that chapter in the Charter of the United Nations that deals with pacific settlement of disputes. United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations* (San Francisco, Calif., 1945).

⁷⁸ Roberts, "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," 310.

⁷⁹ Blazar, Confused by Success, A7.

⁸⁰ Bosnia, for example, is classified as a hostile fire zone. Military personnel serving there are given allowances, tax breaks and awards commensurate with the expectation of coming under hostile fire.

⁸¹ White House press release, "Remarks by the President at National Defense University," January 29, 1998[hereafter Remarks by the President at NDU].

⁸² Deputy Secretary of Defense John P. White, Department of Defense Typescript, "DoD Announces New Military Force Protection Measures," September 16, 1996. President Clinton, used these words: "We will always make their [military personnel] safety a top priority." See "Remarks by the President at NDU." See also Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Department of Defense, *Personal Accountability for Force Protection at Khobar Towers* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, July 31, 1997).

⁸³ Douglas Farah, "General Calls for Pullout From Haiti," *Washington Post*, March 13, 1999, A13.

⁸⁴ Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Department of Defense, "Personal Accountability for Force Protection at Khobar Towers," July 31, 1997.

⁸⁵ Department of the Air Force. "Force Protection Is Job One For U.S. Forces In Saudi Arabia," January 30, 1998. Public statement available on the World Wide Web at http://www.af.mil/photos/c0996_dara7.html.

⁸⁶ Joint Pub 1-02, 218.

⁸⁷ U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, *Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review (BHAAR I) Conference Report* (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1996), 23 [hereafter, BHAAR].

⁸⁸ Dana Priest, "Fear of Casualties Drives Bosnia Debate," *The Washington Post*, December 2, 1995, A1.

⁸⁹ BHAAR, 23-24.

⁹⁰ Department of State, *The Dayton Peace Accords* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1996).

⁹¹ Department of Defense, *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Fort Monroe, Va.: Joint Warfighting Center, June 1997), X-3.

-
- ⁹² *New York Times*, "US Cancels Plans For Raid On Bosnia to Capture 2 Serbs," July 26, 1998, 1.
- ⁹³ *Ibid.*, 1.
- ⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.
- ⁹⁵ Senator Russ Feingold, "Feingold: Military Spending Proposal Defenseless," *Madison Capital Times*, Feb 22, 1999, 1C.
- ⁹⁶ For purposes of this paper the terms "reserves, "reserve component" or "R.C." are intended to include both the National Guard and respective service reserves, unless otherwise specified. For example the terms "Army Reserve" or "Air National Guard" would refer specifically to those entities.
- ⁹⁷ Steven Komarow, "'Weekend Warriors' Putting Their Careers in Harms Way," *USA Today*, Feb 15, 1999, 1A.
- ⁹⁸ Komarow, "'Weekend Warriors' Putting Their Careers in Harms Way, 1A"
- ⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1A.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 1A.
- ¹⁰¹ Otto Kreisher, "Today's Military Relying Increasingly On Reserve Force," San Diego Union-Tribune, Jan 3, 1999.
- ¹⁰² General Dennis Reimer, "CSA Address at AUSA Orlando at the Radisson Twin Tower Hotel," 15 February 1999 [hereafter Reimer, AUSA Orlando].
- ¹⁰³ Although the two six-month rotations require only one combat unit at any given time, the commitment is really 3:1. Every unit that returns from the Sinai must train intensively to regain its combat readiness and must be certified to be considered combat ready. On the front-end, those critical maneuver skills begin atrophying the minute that unit is identified to perform a peace operation and begins training in the peace mission.
- ¹⁰⁴ Ruth H. Phelps and Beatrice J. Farr, ed., *Reserve Component Soldiers as Peacekeepers* (Washington: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, September, 1996), xvii.
- ¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 439.
- ¹⁰⁶ Steven Komarow, "Weekend Warriors Risk Military Careers," *USA Today*, Feb 15, 1999, 1.
- ¹⁰⁷ As of June of 1999, the active Army is currently running a 5,000-6,000 recruiting shortfall for 1999. The salaries for those soldiers was budgeted for in the "full-time" pay account for the active component and those monies are now available to pay for active service of Guard and reservists, including the train-up of the 49th Division.
- ¹⁰⁸ Reimer, AUSA Orlando.
- ¹⁰⁹ Michael E. O'Hanlon and Stephan J. Solarz, "Deciding When To Go?," *Washington Post*, Feb 7, 1999, B1.
- ¹¹⁰ "Straining a Shrunken Military," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 21, 1998, 1.
- ¹¹¹ Lucian Truscott, "A Military Problem Money Can't Solve," *New York Times*, March 2, 1999.
- ¹¹² Richard J. Newman, "Why They Leave," *US News and World Report*, March 1, 1999, 15.

-
- ¹¹³ G. Vernez and G.L. Zellman, *Families and Mission: A Review of the Effects of Family Factors on Army Attrition, Retention, and Readiness* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1987).
- ¹¹⁴ Gary T. Dempsey, "Recruitment Shortfalls, Overseas Adventures," *Washington Post*, February 17, 1999, 16
- ¹¹⁵ "Straining a Shrunken Military," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 21, 1998, 1.
- ¹¹⁶ Senate Armed Services Committee, *General Reimer Testimony*, 105th Congress, 1st sess., March 5, 1997 [hereafter Reimer Testimony, March 5, 1997].
- ¹¹⁷ House National Security Committee, *Views from the Field*, 105th Congress, 1st sess., March 4, 1997
- ¹¹⁸ Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations, FY98*, 105th Cong., 1st sess., March 5, 1997.
- ¹¹⁹ Although unrelated to deployments and OPTEMPO, when low pay is also factored into the decision to reenlist or leave the service, the servicemember often opts to leave. Over 12,000 military families qualify for foodstamps.
- ¹²⁰ Ibid.
- ¹²¹ *Baltimore Sun*, "Pilots, Air Force Feeling Crunch," June 1, 1998, 1.
- ¹²² Dale Eisman, "Increasing Pensions May Not Keep In Sailors, Congressmen Warned," *The Virginian-Pilot*, Feb 26, 99.
- ¹²³ *Baltimore Sun*, "Pilots, Air Force Feeling Crunch, 1.
- ¹²⁴ *Baltimore Sun*, "Pilots, Air Force Feeling Crunch, 1.
- ¹²⁵ Bradley Graham, "Military Pension Maneuvers: Costly Rush To Misjudgement?" *Washington Post*, Feb 11, 1999, 35.
- ¹²⁶ Department of Defense press release, "DOD News Briefing," May 26, 1998.
- ¹²⁷ Historically, peace and humanitarian missions are not funded up-front, but the continued presence in Bosnia has accounted for some funding in the current budget cycle.
- ¹²⁸ Steven Komarow, "Enlistments in Army Fall 20% Short," *USA Today*, Jan 29, 1999, 1A. Note: After three-quarters of the fiscal year executed, Army officials are predicting a 7,000 soldier shortfall for the 1999.
- ¹²⁹ Judith Miller, "UN Monitors Accuse Sierra Leone Peacekeepers of Killings," *The New York Times*, Feb 12, 1999, A10.
- ¹³⁰ Ibid.
- ¹³¹ James Freeman, "Would You Die For Your Country," *USA Today*, Feb 10, 1999.
- ¹³² One of the tenets of U.N. peacekeeping operations is that both belligerent parties must agree to a cease fire before the U.N. will undertake peacekeeping duties under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter. Peace enforcement can only be justified under Chapter VII of the Charter, which deals with the use of force.
- ¹³³ John Hillen, *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations* (Washington, 1998), 84 [hereafter Hillen, *Blue Helmets*].
- ¹³⁴ Ibid., 87.
- ¹³⁵ See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peace Making and Peacekeeping* (New York, NY: United Nations Press, 1992).

¹³⁶ The United Nations, “Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Review of Procurement Related Activities ,” March 18,1999. Public statement available on the World Wide Web at <http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/reports/a53-843e.htm>, p. 2.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 4.

¹³⁸ During the Cold War, several UN missions had peace enforcement provisions, but they were severely limited and did not change the overall nature of the missions. For additional background see Hillen’s *Blue Helmets*, 145.

¹³⁹ Hillen, *Blue Helmets*, 142.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 143.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 145.

¹⁴² Mats R. Berdal, “Peacekeeping in Europe,” in *European Security after The Cold War*, Adelphi Paper 284 (London, 1994), 66.

¹⁴³ Weiss, “The United Nations at Fifty,” 226. Initial?

¹⁴⁴ Adam Roberts, “The United Nations and International Security,” *Survival*, vol.35, Summer 1993, 15.

¹⁴⁵ Hillen, *Blue Helmets*, 238.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 238.

¹⁴⁷ Currently European nations average only \$70,000 per year expended on each person in uniform versus \$200,000 per person for the United States. A large portion of this difference is the cost spent on modernization of high technology weapons systems.

¹⁴⁸ It is likely that the Europeans will resent American leadership in this endeavor after being told that their failure in Bosnia resulted from trying to “go it alone.” The U.S. will resent having to relive the lessons of Vietnam for the benefit of the Europeans and being forced to abandon the Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force. The German, testing a socialist and pacifist government for the first time, will resent being pushed past their “comfort level” and jeopardizing relations with the Russians. The Brits, after joining the Americans in the lead, will be resentful of having the rug pulled out from under them as the U.S. waffled on the prospect of putting in ground troops. The list goes on and on—everyone will remember this with disappointment.

¹⁴⁹ Any operation conducted outside the borders of a NATO country is considered “out of area.” The NATO perimeter, shaped by Greece and Turkey to the south would include the Balkans. By definition, this is out of area although it is clearly within the NATO perimeter. It is this area where NATO will continue to remain proactive in peace operations.