

**CONTEMPORARY THREATS: TERRORISM AND THE  
CHALLENGES FOR ARMED FORCES – a Finnish Point of View**

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# 1. Introduction

Planning for broad structural reform has commenced within the armed forces of many countries, including Finland, and, as such, it is affecting the operations of military forces, while being influenced by a number of factors: changes in the security environment, a decrease in the number of planned wartime troops, new tasks, increased international cooperation, and the continuing rise of costs. Predicting future threats is one of the most important issues when formulating the role and tasks of armed forces. Such predictions appear in the defense doctrines described in political papers and based on threat analysis. The main purpose of these doctrines is legitimacy of and guidance for the actions to be taken; at the same time, they provide information about the treatment of both their own people and the opposing forces. The role of future defence forces plays a decisive part in this reform, especially in the context of the growing needs of civilian crisis cooperation. Demands for the forces to function as a tool for operations other than war are increasing. This paper attempts to provide additional information regarding possible future threats, asymmetric warfare, modern terrorism, and the doctrine of armed forces. My central argument is that defence forces in Western states should be modernized and partly reorganized in accordance with updated threat analyses. This document is based on debates and discussions experienced during my fellowship at Harvard in 2006-07.

Finland receives its official guidance, legitimization, and information from the current Government Programme, Security and Defense Policy report 2004, and the Strategy for Protecting the Functions Vital to the Society 2003/2006.<sup>1</sup> Additionally, the official pattern of thought in the EU affects Finland's way of thinking: threats in the EU are publicly described in the European Security Strategy of 2003.<sup>2</sup> The need for new and open threat analysis arose

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1 *Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004*. Government report. Prime Minister's Office: Publications 18/2004 (vns 6/2004 vp) and *Strategy for Protecting the Functions Vital to the Society*. (vn pp 27.11.2003 and 23.11.2006).

2 *Secure Europe in Better World*. European Security Strategy. (Brussels 12.12.2003).

after the Cold War because security threats were increasingly multi-faceted. There was also a need to legitimize the existence of the post-Cold War security structure.

The Finnish traditional and most important goal is to maintain a deterrent threshold – for the use of force against Finland – that would be high enough to outweigh the perceived benefits of attack.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately, this idea of deterrence – especially against modern terrorism – often fails against new waves of wide-ranging security threats.

Some countries have completely replaced their security analysis in response to new threats, but some haven't. In many cases – as in Finland – many of the old threats still exist. Whether future threats are military, political, economic, environmental or other, all officials are involved. As a part of total defense, the Finnish Armed Forces also has a vital role to play in the future, and Finnish Military Forces have to sustain flexible military capabilities in three areas:

1. Finland's military defence (fundamental task)
2. Support of other security authorities and society
3. International Crisis Management.

The Finnish Defence Forces need to be prepared to act fast, with an ability to shift emphasis as demanded. It seems that forces are trained, equipped, and financed, primarily for the first and third tasks, but they are not prepared sufficiently for cooperating with and supporting other authorities. For the Finnish Defense Forces, there exists an obligation to maintain the possibility of military threat, and to highlight the effectiveness of international crisis management. By considering human security threats more intensively, however, the military may also find a justification for its existence and work.

The need to involve more civilian management and knowledge in times of crisis is increasing. Responsibilities among ministries are growing. Non-governmental organizations and private enterprises have to be involved in total security arrangements. The concern of the entire nation is required.

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<sup>3</sup> *Securely into the Future*, Ministry of Defence Strategy 2025, Ministry of Defence, (Helsinki 2006).

This document will study elements of the Finnish experience as well as the challenges that developed countries are facing. The focus is on modern threats. Are military forces capable of handling new demands? If not, what are the recommendations?

The main objectives of this document are: to study contemporary and future threats faced by the citizens of Finland, the EU, and some neighboring countries; and, consequently, to recommend ideas for the security concept and the future role of the Armed Forces in Finland. The emphasis of the study is modern terrorism, because it is one of the most unknown and troublesome phenomena today.

## 2. Contemporary Threats

### **Global Concepts of Threat**

At the individual level, a “threat” is an expression of intent to do harm.<sup>4</sup> The most vital necessity for individuals want is safety and security. The same principle applies to states and organizations as well. The threat gives guidance for the planning and preparations that institutions must make, yet at the same time, such planning legitimizes the actions taken against the probable danger.

According to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it is prohibited to threaten anyone. If someone breaks the international law by threatening someone, the threatened party is justified in using force for the purpose of self-defense. Imminent threat is a standard criterion in international law for when the need for action is instant, overwhelming, and leaves no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2004

<sup>5</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imminent\\_threat](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imminent_threat)

At the end of 2004, the UN published a report to highlight the threats we face internationally; it concludes that there are six major threat categories:

- war between states;
- violence within states, including civil wars, large-scale human rights abuses and genocide;
- poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation;
- nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons;
- terrorism; and
- transnational organized crime

Terrorism is emphasized as a modern joint threat to all states, and to the UN as a whole. New aspects of the threat – including the rise of a global terrorist network, and the potential for terrorist use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons – require new responses.

Of all security threats, nuclear terrorism is the most profound.<sup>6</sup>

## **Contemporary Threats in Developed Countries**

There is a wide range of risks listed in the threat analysis of developed countries. Most threats are man-made and can be avoided. But some threats are common in nature, so that international cooperation of protection needs to be arranged. Citizens in developed countries should be most concerned by traffic and falling accidents, marginalization, alcoholism, crime, and smoking. Those threats are still imminent and inevitable today.

Individuals can additionally be affected by the threats society is facing. Societies have to be protected against pressure and the use of military force, terrorism, crime, natural disasters, major accidents, and environmental hazards. They also need to be prepared for economic,

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<sup>6</sup> *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change.* (United Nations, 2004).  
<http://www.un.org/secureworld/report3.pdf>

health, and welfare disturbances. Global warming, pollution, overpopulation, lack of natural resources, international terrorism and crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and control of various regional crises are generally understood as modern threats. But are all these threats as imminent as we have been taught? The answer is no, and the reasons will be explained below.

All countries are justified in being prepared for self-defense against imminent threats. While the terrain differs between countries, each nation has security threats of its own, each government has specific security plans, and all nations can be prepared, but no single country is self-sufficient.

## Threats in the European Union (EU)

The EU's future in the globalized world is uncertain; the EU is on course to "the fog of the future."<sup>7</sup> Creating threat scenarios is more challenging because every country is unique and their threat analyses vary. According to the Security Strategy of the EU, a large-scale attack against another Member State is unlikely, but there are complex, invisible, and unexpected threats such as those outlined in defense doctrines: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, and organized crime. For example, an uncontrolled pandemic or attacks using weapons of mass destruction are seen as possible threats.<sup>8</sup> Most dangerous is the combination of two or more of those threats.

In Europe, terrorism – mainly perceived as Islamic in nature – is mentioned as a general threat. Among Europeans, terrorism is more or less a strongly felt threat, or is put in perspective by the idea that their home countries are less "in the line of fire" than others, or

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<sup>7</sup> *An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs*, European Defense Agency. (3 October 2006).

<sup>8</sup> Ibid



are more generally perceived as having an effect on world peace and stability.<sup>9</sup> Like the UN, the EU is most concerned with terrorists connecting with nuclear weapons.

The principle of free movement for persons is a very real challenge at the fore on the EU's agenda. In controlling illegal human trafficking, Member States cannot base their interests solely on national interests; after the enlargement of the EU, principles of joint interests and mutual trust among 27 countries will have more tangible meaning.

Even though the EU has a structure that covers almost all the areas and agencies, there are many threats (like isolation, competition of energy resources) missing from the doctrine – and probably omitted from the debate, too. For Nordic countries, the consideration of total security seems to be common. On the contrary for the EU, switching from a military-oriented threat analysis to a wider scale of thinking is not intuitive and a change in mindset may take some time.

## Threats in Finland

Compared to that of many other western nations, the Finnish threat analysis is less detailed; risks are described in general. According to the Strategy for Protecting the Functions Vital to the Society (2006), modern threat models in Finland are:

- disturbance to the electricity grid
- serious disturbance affecting the health and income security of the population
- serious disturbance in the functioning of the economy
- major accidents and natural disasters
- environmental threats
- terrorism, as well as organized, and other serious crime
- threats linked to migratory flows
- political, economic and military pressure

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<sup>9</sup> *The European citizens and the future of Europe*. Qualitative study in the 25 Member States. (May, 2006)

- the need for use of military force<sup>10</sup>

If these models are in the order of predicted probability, threats that military forces are facing and being prepared for are at the bottom of the list. Naturally, the impact of those analyzed military threats is still stronger. Moreover, the first ones listed occur more often and they are usually quite harmless.

Traditionally, terrorism and other asymmetric threats have not been real problems in Finland. Finns are ethnically homogenous and the nation is stable. No imminent threat of international terrorism exists in Finland. Despite that, Finland has to consider, seriously, a possibility that the country could be used as a transit route or safe haven by terrorists. Additionally, there's the possibility that a contact in Finland could be involved in recruiting, financing, or organizing terrorist activities. Every country has to be prepared to protect an embassy or other people and property belonging to another state or an international enterprise. We cannot rule out the threats that the international community is facing. Reflections of global terrorism or terrorism in Russia do not always respect the borders of nation-states.

## Threats in Neighboring Countries - Sweden

Security strategy policy in Sweden and Finland is similar. The only major difference is – as it has been for a long time – in military threats. Sweden is not expected to feel militarily threatened for the coming ten years, mainly because of inadequate action taken in previous catastrophes, and the defence doctrine in Sweden is more concrete than in Finland. Today, Swedish total defence focuses on improving command structure, cooperation, and technical systems in practice.<sup>11</sup> Yet accurate risk analysis has its disadvantages. It may prevent authorities from reacting quickly and flexibly against wide ranging security threats.

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<sup>10</sup> *Strategy for Protecting the Functions Vital to the Society*. (vn pp 27.11.2003 and 23.11.2006).

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/2174> and *Samverkan vid kris – för ett säkrare samhälle. Government Offices in Sweden*. (2005/06:133 16.3.2006) and *Vårt framtida försvar* (2004/05:5 23.9.2004). “The Swedish defence system is undergoing one of the largest military reforms to be undertaken by Sweden in modern times as it is transformed from a defence force against invasion to a

## Threats in Neighboring Countries – Russia

Today the position of the current Russian administration seems to be the threatened by the projected US missile defence shield, by NATO expansion along Russia's frontiers, and by the policies of some of the Baltic States toward their ethnic Russian minorities and Soviet-era war memorials on their territory.<sup>12</sup> President Putin has highlighted that US foreign policy, which incites other countries to seek nuclear weapons for defense against an "almost uncontained use of military force."<sup>13</sup> There are many active terrorists and nuclear weapons available, thus the use of nuclear weapons by Russian terrorists is the most threatening internal scenario that would have immense external impact.

Russia doesn't have a National Security Strategy as an officially published document – as most developed countries do, such as the United States. Shortsighted and unforeseen Russian security strategies are often delivered during the President's official speeches. Even though Russia updated its security concept in 2000, the defense doctrine is still traditional, with no modern threats articulated in it as they are in western security doctrines: threats are mainly understood to exist only in the domestic sphere. The Russian administration lacks awareness of the increasing threat of global terrorism. Russia tries to get legitimization for its strong internal security measures by using the international global war against terrorism as a "key factor" and decoy. In February 2005, the Duma changed the law "On Defense" to permit the army to take part in counterterrorism actions involving the use of military force.<sup>14</sup> As a broken state, Russia tries to maintain its national unity by eliminating all the risks that could

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mobile, flexible operational defence which can both defend Sweden and take part in international operations." See crisis Tsunami winter 2004 or Gudrun storm autumn 2005.

<sup>12</sup> Interview of Russia defence minister Sergei Ivanov, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, (8 February 2007).

<sup>13</sup> Speech by the President of Russia Vladimir Putin, at the 43d annual Munich Conference on Security Policy in Germany. (10 February 2007). "Unilateral, illegitimate actions have not solved a single problem that they have become a hotbed of further conflicts. One state, the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way".

<sup>14</sup> Herspring, Dale R., *Putin's Russia, Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain*. P 189.(Rowan & Littlefield Publishers,2007).

lead Russia into decay. Russia will always react if other countries or organizations act within the vicinity of Russian security interests. The latest example was the Estonian statue crisis that occurred in Tallinn in April 2007.<sup>15</sup> Russia also reacted strongly against the U.S. plan to deploy missile defense interceptors in Eastern Europe, namely in Poland and the Czech Republic.<sup>16</sup> These incidents, which are still in progress, have been viewed as catalysts for revival of the Cold War. There is – once again – a need to obtain negotiated proposals and suggestions in military affairs, to serve as a tool for better foreign policy between nations.

The military will always play a vital role in Russia's future. President Putin plans to recreate a more robust and powerful version of the Russian Armed Forces by 2016, which is not infeasible: Russia has the technology and manpower required for rebuilding a strong military, and it is cooperating willingly, in military affairs with vital partners such as China.

Military success depends naturally on economic growth. "All observers are united on one point: unless Russia is able to create a stable, healthy economy, there is little chance that it will evolve in the direction of the kind of democratic polity that most Russians seek."<sup>17</sup> As Putin himself puts it: "It will take us approximately fifteen years and an annual growth of our Gross Domestic Product by 8 percent a year to reach the per capita GDP level of present day Portugal or Spain, which are not among the world's industrialized leaders."<sup>18</sup> Military reform takes time; security, especially economic security as a vital element, comes before defence in Putin's thoughts - and most probably in his successors' thoughts too. Russian leaders seem to be focusing on a total security concept at this time in order to strengthen future defence.

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<sup>15</sup> Estonian government decided to move a controversial Soviet war memorial from the centre of Tallinn to a military cemetery further away from the downtown area. The issue that was called as Estonian statue crisis soured relations between Estonia and Russia. See for example <http://www.hs.fi/english/article/> or <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/05/04/016.html>

<sup>16</sup> See for example [http://russianforces.org/blog/2006/05/missile\\_defense\\_interceptors\\_i.shtml](http://russianforces.org/blog/2006/05/missile_defense_interceptors_i.shtml)

<sup>17</sup> Herspring, Dale R., *Putin's Russia, Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain*. P. 7. (Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2007)

<sup>18</sup> Vladimir Putin, "Russia at the Turn of the Millennium" or [www.government.gov.ru/english/statVP\\_engl\\_1.html](http://www.government.gov.ru/english/statVP_engl_1.html).

Since the beginning of his term, Putin has wanted to improve conventional capabilities in the military. Putin's guidance in meeting with high command in November 2000, articulated that "[t]he Army and the Navy must be ready in all strategic directions to neutralize and repulse any army conflict and aggression. And one important task is the creation and stationing of groups of permanent readiness units in the Southwestern and Central-Asian directions. Here the state of the general purpose forces is of primary importance. Such forces must have the latest technology."<sup>19</sup> Putin's risk analysis has already proved correct. This prescience is validated by the increasing military and terrorist pressure from the Russia's southern strategic direction.<sup>20</sup>

Russia is, arguably, the most likely source for nuclear terrorists. Ten years ago, General Alexander Lebed, the security adviser to the president, stated: "more than 100 nuclear weapons out of the supposed number of 250 are not under the control of the Russian Armed Forces. I don't know their location."<sup>21</sup> There are two opposing arguments about the future of Russian nuclear weapons: there will be either a reduction of nuclear weapons because of prohibitive cost, or, conversely, there will be an increase in upkeep and development because of the high cost of conventional forces.

Russians know that their nuclear storages are unsecured. But their actions to improve nuclear safety have been insufficient, even though they have been sponsored by other countries. In the beginning of September 2004, when the killing of children in Beslan took place, Putin ordered extra guard forces to secure nuclear facilities. One month later, a group of Dagestanis took control of a Russian military nuclear facility in Zelenograd (close to Moscow). Thirteen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the nuclear security balance sheet

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<sup>19</sup> Herspring, Dale R., *Vladimir Putin and Military Reform in Russia*, European Security, Vol 14 Num 1. (Routledge March 2005)

<sup>20</sup> See for example: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3654110.stm>: "The US ambassador to Georgia says some international terrorists are present especially in Caucasus on the border with Chechnya." Or other example is US missile shield in the area of the Russia's southern direction.

<sup>21</sup> Interview of General Alexander Lebed in 60 Minutes "The Perfect Terrorist Weapon", CBS. (7 September 1997).

states that there are still HEU and plutonium available for 44,000 nuclear weapons in Russia.<sup>22</sup>

## Threats in the United States

The National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) contains clear indication of the threats the country is facing. The same way of thinking naturally flows into lower level doctrines, such as the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS). Threats are described as goals for which the United States has to:

- champion aspirations for human dignity
- defeat global terrorism
- defuse regional conflicts
- prevent enemies from threatening the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
- ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade
- expand the circle of development, by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy
- deeply cooperate with other main centers of global power
- transform national security institutions to meet the challenges of the 21st century and
- engage the opportunities of globalization<sup>23</sup>

Again, it is most hazardous if two or more of the above mentioned crises take place at the same time and by the same hands. It is acknowledged, through experience, that these tasks are listed by order of importance and publicity. Regardless of their strong national emphasis, these tasks symbolize modern ways of thinking with respect to solving future security challenges.

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<sup>22</sup> Bunn, Wier and Holdren, *Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials*, (Harvard 2003).

<sup>23</sup> *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. White House. (Washington D.C.:2006).

The highest level doctrines (NSS, NDS, and NMS) do not highlight detailed, specific threats. Yet this topic can be studied by using other sources. For example, both President George W. Bush (Republican) and Senator John Kerry (Democrat) stated in the 2004 presidential campaign that the most serious threat was nuclear proliferation. And it still is considered the most serious threat. In the latest Report of Terrorism that was released April 30, 2007, “al Qaeda and its loose confederation of affiliated movements remain the most immediate national security threat to the United States and a significant security challenge to the international community.”<sup>24</sup> The US political challenges ahead include Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the crisis in the Middle East, China’s anti-satellite tests, and Russia’s arms sales.<sup>25</sup>

In the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States seemed to be the danger caused by weapons of mass destruction. The country concentrated on that, together with the war on terrorism. To prevent nuclear terrorism is considered to be a priority security task today (figure 1). Nuclear terrorism should be considered by the next administration as a priority threat for the United States.<sup>26</sup>

The modern way of thinking in security threats and other affairs is strongly military oriented. Today, the U.S. military dominates in traditional forms of warfare. New military demands are composed of irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges. The rise of extremist movements and the absence of effective governance are recognized as the main factors for asymmetric and irregular challenges. The U.S. administration finds catastrophic challenges most problematic and risky, if transnational terrorists, proliferation, and problem states that seek WMD find each other. The security of the United States is also understood to be endangered by disruptive capabilities that affect its vulnerabilities. In particular, innovations in

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24 *Country Reports on Terrorism*, The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. U.S. Department of State. (April 30, 2007).


25 Speech by US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the 43d annual Munich Conference on Security Policy in Germany, 11 February 2007. (His first speech as defence secretary)

26 Allison, Graham, *Nuclear Terrorism, Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*, (New York 2005). “The president should make the prevention of a nuclear terrorist attack on an American city an absolute priority”.

27 Cirincione, Joseph, *Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons*. 2007.

biotechnology, cyberspace, or directed energy weapons are seen as disruptive challenges.<sup>28</sup> These challenges are described in figure 1.

**Figure 1: Preparation of Threats in the United States**



<sup>28</sup> *National Defense Strategy of the United States (NDS)*. Department of Defense (Washington D.C. March 2005)



The rise in anti-American sentiment is of particular concern because of the growing alliance between Latin American leftist blocs (mainly in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador) and radical Islamists.<sup>29</sup> Growing Islamist activism in the region – the recruitment of Latin Americans for migration to the United States is one regional threat.<sup>30</sup> To defeat global terrorism and to prevent terrorists from networking, Latin America should not serve as a safe haven for terrorist activities. Admittedly, there are many safe havens in Asia and Africa, but South and Central America present as most challenging, mainly because of geographic proximity and migratory flows to North America.

## Conclusions of Threats

Even though this study presents mainly man made dangers, there remain numerous contemporary threats, and military threats between nations in the globalized world are not the sole risk. Nuclear threats seem to be highlighted in many threat analyses. Nuclear war is no longer considered a serious threat, but there is a real possibility of offensive use of nuclear weapons and some will even argue that nuclear terrorism is inevitable. Yet the Juggernaut of chemical and biological weapons is underestimated in modern reasoning, even though it would be imminent in the developed world. On a related note, it seems that perceived security threats legitimize the existence of armed forces as much as actual threats.

Traditional threats, such as conventional or nuclear war between states, have almost disappeared from common reasoning. The most essential reason for the modern risk analysis is the political change in international relations and the interactive globalization during the last 15 years. Ideological antithesis has been diminished and prosperity increased. The efforts of

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<sup>29</sup> see Farah, Douglas, *The Growing Terrorism Challenges From Latin America*, (February 18th, 2007). or Debates for U.S. president candidacy 2008.

<sup>30</sup> *Country Reports on Terrorism*. The office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. U.S. Department of State. (Washington DC April 30, 2007). See as an example: New York Times in June 2, 2007 U.S. Federal authorities charged four Latin men with conspiring to blow up John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York, foiling an alleged terrorist plot that stretched from New York to the Caribbean and South America

the international community and multinational organizations have reduced the risk of conventional war, which is considered to be too fatal and hazardous because of high quality armaments. There are still some countries, however, which are militarily prepared to preempt a neighboring state from crossing the border as a hostile enemy. More often, countries have changed their threat analysis for violence within states: they need to prevent civil wars, large-scale human rights abuses, and genocide.

As a vital part of the security system, military forces must be prepared for operations other than war in the future. With respect to the above mentioned threats and strategies, countries are creating security policies that demand more professional forces. Armed forces have to be readied for asymmetric warfare, crisis management, and close cooperation with civilian authorities.

To address modern threats, security arrangements need to be flexible, responsive, rapid, and, at the same time, focused. If deterrence does not eliminate threat, the total security system must react effectively to all kind of incidents, and this can be achieved only by internal and international cooperation. Countries will be valued and ranked by their security arrangements. The challenge of responsibility always exists: who takes responsibility for specific risks, and who creates effective response systems for them? Miscalculations will be more fatal in the future than during the Cold War. In the linked and globalized world, heads of state and other high security authorities are under an obligation, not only to their own country and people, but also to other countries.

## 3. Terrorism as a Modern Threat

### **The Nature of Terrorism**

It seems that global terrorism is the phenomenon that influences most modern threat analysis all over the world. Most armies need to update their doctrines, training and acquisition procedures, and operational plans.

A successful terrorist attack against any state makes the world less safe, raises international anxiety levels, and has negative economic impact. A new three-dimensional international power – unilateralism, multilateralism and transnationalism – helps terrorists launch successful operations. This triad encourages terrorists to move freely and to act widely. America's unilateral military power certainly dominates the picture, but at the same time, this dominance and the clear identification of the enemy make fighting easier for terrorists. In the middle is an economic power that is multilateral; it includes all financial transactions and operations that terrorists are fighting to control. The bottom dimension features complex transnational relations and networks that cross borders and remain beyond the control of dominant actors. These relations also include terrorist networks that effectively operate within what Joseph S. Nye Jr., a professor at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, describes as the vulnerable three-dimensional world.<sup>31</sup>

Terrorism is a deliberate tactic designed to kill and destroy<sup>32</sup> and it targets noncombatants with the objective of spreading fear and intimidation. Usually, terrorism is used for political purposes,<sup>33</sup> or, as officially defined by the U.S. State Department, terrorism is "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."<sup>34</sup> Terrorism occurs

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<sup>31</sup> Nye Jr, Joseph S., *The New Rome Meets the New Barbarians – America's Power*. The Economist P. 24. (2002).

<sup>32</sup> *The 9/11 Commission Report*. Official Government Report, (U.S. Government Printing Office, July 26, 2004).

<sup>33</sup> Presentation by Richardson, Louise, Executive Dean of the Radcliffe Institute, Harvard Faculty of Arts and Science, 1 Feb 2007 and Nye Jr, Joseph S., *Soft Power*. (New York, Perseus Book Group 2004). p. 21.

<sup>34</sup> *Country Reports on Terrorism 2005*, National Counterterrorism Center, U.S. Department of State (April 7, 2006.) and see also Pillar, Paul R., *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*. (Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 2001): Paul Pillar, the Former Deputy Chief of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center, defines that there are four key elements of terrorism: (1.) It is premeditated – planned in advance, rather than an impulsive act of rage, (2) It is political- not criminal, like violence that groups such as the mafia use to get money, but designed to change existing political order, (3) It is aimed at civilians-not at

in conjunction with, and is fed by crises: challenges of economic inequality, organized crime, regional tensions, humiliation, or other matters of global instability.

Terrorism, as the method of fighting preferred by a weaker party, has existed for thousands of years. According to records since the first century A.D., the tactic was employed by Christians, Jews, and other religious groups, secular groups, and even atheists. The transformation from ideological and separatist fighting to religious terrorism has taken place in recent history.

Terrorism as a modern threat is considered to be more impressive than it actually is. The difficulty of anticipating the attack, surviving the consequences, and controlling the threat causes fear on an individual level. Furthermore, mass media disseminates images of terrorism efficiently and on a large scale, which heightens fear.

The world is confronting a new brand of terrorism based on religion, sectarian, and nationalist convictions. While terrorist movements have had hundreds or even thousands of members in the past, these new terrorist groups have only a few members. The new terrorism is more radical, irrational, and difficult to detect. Clear dividing lines once separated terrorists from guerrillas or criminals, and homegrown terrorists from state-sponsored terrorists, but these lines of definition have almost disappeared.<sup>35</sup>

## What Motivates the Targeting of Noncombatants?

Terrorists may have the following overarching aims: to gain autonomy from a dominant state, to obtain religious freedom, or to promote social revolution. There has been a conventional wisdom that terrorists do not consider heavy casualties, rather they attach to

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military targets or combat-ready troops and (4) It is carried out by subnational groups-not by the army of the country.

<sup>35</sup> Laqueur, Walter, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 251 and Nye Jr., Joseph S., *Soft Power*. (New York, Perseus Book Group 2004. p. 22

seek publicity. This assessment has unfortunately been proved wrong: use of force to incur maximum casualties seems to be the primary goal of today's terrorists.

Terrorists are not simply lunatic or barbaric; not all of them hate western values of freedom. There is a wide range of primary motives for performing acts of terrorism – perpetrators want revenge, renown, and reaction:<sup>36</sup> they wish to avenge injustice or humiliation suffered by their community; they seek renown to bring attention to their cause and to themselves; and they fight to provoke a reaction from those whom they consider enemies. They very seldom have any idea of the reaction, however, and while the objectives terrorists may be legitimate, terrorism itself as a tactic is never justified.

### Who are the Terrorists?

It is widely agreed that we should always bear in mind that terrorism, as an established method for using force, has no deeper links to any culture or religion.<sup>37</sup> And even though we have to be cautious to associate no single faith with terrorism, modern terrorism is often linked to Islam.

As argued earlier, terrorism as a strategy is more irrational in contemporary times, but it is not always the same situation on a tactical level: studies by psychologists have shown that most terrorists as individuals are neither unbalanced nor irrational. Even suicide terrorists are argued to be extraordinary rational: they use minimum efforts for maximum effect; they are not totally immoral, although their acts certainly appear so in the eyes of their victims; and they want to justify their acts morally through a different means of communication.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Central Intelligence Agency. (February 2003) and presentation by Richardson, Louise, Executive Dean of the Radcliffe Institute, Harvard Faculty of Arts and Science, 1 Feb 2007

<sup>37</sup> Remarks by Abdullah Gul, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey., UN General Assembly, 61<sup>st</sup> Session (New York City, September 22, 2006)

<sup>38</sup> Saul, Ben, *Two Justifications for Terrorism: A Moral Legal Response*. Foreign Policy in Focus Report (January 2006)

Terrorists have long-term plans, but some of them lack vision of fulfillment. For example, if there is a vision that Jews and Arabs can live together peacefully in the disputed state of Israel and the Palestinian Territory, it would be true that achievement of the vision is not reached by aggression or chronic conflict. The same could be said for the internal situation in some Arab countries, among Shiites and Sunnis, and, increasingly, between the warring Palestinian factions.

Wars in Afghanistan and especially in Iraq create more terrorism. The problem resides not only in the Middle East but in northern Africa and Europe as well. Jihadist fighters returning from Iraq pose a serious threat. Many tragic incidents in the 1990s were fueled by the veterans of the then Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, insurgents whom were originally supported by Western countries in the 1980s.

## Recruiting and Financing Terrorists

Even though statistics and most studies demonstrate that terrorist attacks often result in failure rather than success, the number of volunteer terrorists is increasing. This phenomenon is explained by a radical Islamist: “The threat posed by Islamist terrorism – especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology that poses the catastrophic threat at this moment of history”<sup>39</sup>. Recruitment efforts in the jihad, or holy war against “American terrorists,” have been successful: young Muslims from around the world join the World Islamic Front and follow its fatwa, or interpretation of Islamic law.<sup>40</sup>

Terrorists utilize safe havens – ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed areas of a given country, and virtual havens – almost impossible to track or control – where they are free and

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<sup>39</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States; The Commission Report. (New York 2004).

<sup>40</sup> Ibid

able to organize, plan, raise funds, spread propaganda, recruit, train, and generally operate<sup>41</sup> using global communications and financial systems – such as the Internet and global media.

Recruitment can take place anywhere: in restaurants, homes, mosques, and prisons. But, as mentioned earlier, terrorists are mainly recruited through the internet. Joining the terrorist organization does not normally need to have any special procedures. Despite announcing volunteers, contemporary recruiting takes place from bottom to top. Volunteers are enough and they can apply to be terrorists. There is no need for great motivating efforts by the leaders either.

Terrorists are financed like all other criminals, with sources coming from:

- Financial and material support from governments
- Robbery/theft
- Document forging
- Currency fraud
- Money laundering
- The manufacture and sale of pirated products
- Human smuggling
- Contraband smuggling
- Drug and arms trafficking

For example, the dynamite that was used for the Madrid train bombings was exchanged for hashish<sup>42</sup>.

## **Means Employed by Terrorists**

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<sup>41</sup> *Country Reports on Terrorism*. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. U.S. Department of State. (April 30, 2007).

<sup>42</sup> Widely known fact that was reported by media. See for example: [www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-03-09-madrid\\_x.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-03-09-madrid_x.htm) or [www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3670627.stm](http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3670627.stm)

Weapons used by terrorists, or those in which they have an interest, range from handguns to nuclear weapons.<sup>43</sup> For example, five British al Qaeda linked men that received life sentences in May 2007 were found guilty of conspiring to attack targets including a crowded night-club, a shopping mall, and Britain's gas and electrical grids. They even planned to poison cans of beer at soccer games, and to arm radio-controlled airplanes with explosives and fly them into British cities.<sup>44</sup>

To be renowned, terrorists need to make attacks that not only to have the potential to cause physical harm, but would also have a substantial negative psychological impact. Chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) weapons, plus suicide and digital attacks, may be categorized as weapons of catastrophic effect (WCE). WCEs result in a significant negative impact on a nation's physical, psychological, and economic well-being, thereby causing a major modification of routine activity.

Terrorist capability, chance and purpose, combined with the vulnerability of the possible target, all determine the target. If revenge is the main motivation, the target has to have symbolic, iconic, and economic importance. Government targets, a concentration of people, or lines of transportation capture media interest. Large media coverage motivates and delights terrorists who seek revenge and prestige.

Terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are simply possible because CBR weapons are available. However chemical and biological weapons are not considered as massively destructive as nuclear weapons. Main reasons for not using CB weapons are their low lethality and technical delivery problems. Addition to this, there also exist many effective countermeasures. Attacks using WMD in the form of chemical and biological materials are possible, but the tactic would not produce results as massively destructive as nuclear weapons; CB has low lethality and challenges in technical delivery.

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<sup>43</sup> Biological weapons, Blades (9/11), Chemical weapons, Digital weapons, Direct fire arms, Handguns, Improvised explosive devises (IEDs), Mortars, Nuclear weapons (plutonium or uranium), Poisons, Radiological weapons, Remote controlled weapons, Suicide bombers, Vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs)

<sup>44</sup> Conspirators goal was to get British military out of Afghanistan



Despite these abovementioned lethal weapons, terrorists seem to be focusing upon combining conventional weapons with advanced tactics: suicide bombings and the use of improvised explosive devices, are developed and trained in North Africa and Iraq, and exported to Afghanistan, Europe, and many other nations

## Suicide Terrorism

Suicide terrorism, used as weapon and tactic, has been occurring with increasing frequency around the world. In Afghanistan, for example, the number of suicide attackers rose from 27 in 2005 to 139 in 2006.<sup>45</sup> A suicide attack can be defined in two ways: a narrow definition limited to situations in which an attacker kills himself, and a broad definition that includes any instance when an attacker fully expects to be killed during the attack.<sup>46</sup> The attacker kills others at the same time that he kills himself. Suicide terrorists use normally fatal weapons and explosives to destroy the target. The most modern method is the use of remote controlled suicide bombers.<sup>47</sup>

There are no clear explanations for the growing interest of suicide terror. Terrorist analysts argue constantly about the causes of this phenomenon. Some argue that this tactic follows a strategic logic, one specifically designed to coerce modern liberal democracies to make significant territorial concessions. It has been increasing in frequency because terrorists have learned that it pays.<sup>48</sup> Targets may be regional, economic, or political, but the main objective

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<sup>45</sup> *Country Reports on Terrorism*. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. U.S. Department of State. (April 30, 2007) and Riedel, Bruce, *Al Qaeda Strikes Back*. Foreign Affairs (May/June 2007).

<sup>46</sup> Pape, Robert A., *The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. (The University of Chicago. August 2003).

Narrow definition is commonly used. There are only few instances in which an attacker expected to be killed by others. One of those is Baruch Goldstein, who had earlier decided to continue killing Palestinians in the 1994 Hebron Massacre until he was killed.

<sup>47</sup> For Example Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is argued to be using remote controlled explosions in suicide terrorists in Algeria in April 2006.

<sup>48</sup> Pape, Robert A., *The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, (The University of Chicago. August 2003). Terrorist goals: Hezbollah – U.S./France/Israel out of Lebanon; LTTE (the Liberation Tigers of

is to convince the opposing society that there are more attacks to come. Islamic Fundamentalism or psychological applications are commonly used in reasoning – especially in the media, but modern suicide terrorism is not limited to religious indoctrination. The contemporary “globalization of martyrdom” is argued to be multi-causal. There are cultural, organizational and individual approaches. Suicide terrorism involves individual motivations, organizational strategies, and societal conflicts. One largely agreed reason seems simply to be that individuals commit to suicide attacks because they feel humiliated; they are suffering from personal crisis.<sup>49</sup>

## Nuclear Terrorism and BC Weapons

Two modern threats combined - a terrorist attack by nuclear means on a city, is predicted to be the worst scenario. Such an attack would kill tens of thousands of people at once by its explosion; after the immediate burning and pressure from the blast, more casualties will be incurred through long-term radiation. In the short term, radiation exposure causes nausea, but the longer term results are cancer and death; the effects are clearly illustrated in the website of the Federation of American Scientists ([www.fas.org](http://www.fas.org)). . An attack is also predicted to be probably either an attack against a nuclear plant or the use of dirty bombs – weapons which combine conventional explosives with radioactive material. It has been estimated that hitting

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Tamil Eelam) – Sri Lanka accept Tamil state; Hamas – Israel out of Palestine; PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) – Turkey accept Kurd autonomy; Al Qaeda – U.S. out of Saudi Peninsula; Chechen Rebels – Russia out of Chechnya; Kashmir Rebels – India out of Kashmir.

<sup>49</sup> Israeli, Raphael, *Islamikaze: Manifestations of Islamic Martyrology*. (New York 2003); Capan, Ergun ed., *An Islamic Perspective: Terror and Suicide Attacks*. (Somerset, New Jersey 2004); Khosrokhavar, Farhad., *Suicide Bombers: Allah's New Martyrs*. (London 2005); Gambetta, Diego ed., *Making Sense of Suicide Missions*. (Oxford University Press 2005); Bloom, Mia., *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror*. (Columbia University Press 2005), Pedahzur, Ami, *Suicide Terrorism*. (London 2005); Hafez, Mohammed M., *Rationality, Culture, and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers: A Preliminary Theoretical Synthesis and Illustrative Case Study*. (Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29. March 2005); Moghadam, Assaf, *Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom: A Critique of Dying to Win*. (Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29. December 2006).

the nuclear plant would release radioactivity at least three times more severe than the Chernobyl leak. The reactor itself does not explode.

So far a terrorist attack using nuclear weapons is considered unlikely, mainly because of the difficulty of obtaining the required radioactive materials, such as highly enriched uranium (HEU). But the belief that terrorists would need the help of a state to gain a nuclear capability is argued to be wrong<sup>50</sup> – and there are easier ways to attack by using nuclear means. The detonation of a dirty bomb, dynamite or another conventional explosive, in order to detonate a widely available radioactive source (like the cesium or cobalt in certain medical devices) is considered much more feasible. These means might cause immediate injuries and death, since the radioactive residue could cover a two to three block area, posing a health threat, creating panic, and, on a larger scale, economic disruption.

Even though nuclear weapons are difficult to handle, it has been argued that an attack of nuclear terrorism is inevitable. As General Eugene Habiger, former commander in chief of United States Strategic Command, says: “it’s a matter of when.”<sup>51</sup> Nuclear terrorism is considered to be one of the priority threats for the Western hemisphere.<sup>52</sup>

For terrorist purposes, nuclear weapons need to be compact and easy to handle. A ten kiloton explosion would be considered effective enough to achieve the goals of terrorist organizations. To make such an explosion, either 15 kilograms of uranium-235, or 4 kilograms of plutonium-239 would be necessary. Uranium is easier to handle because it is less radioactive, but a larger amount of it is required. The biggest challenge for terrorists is that such materials are expensive and almost impossible to manufacture independently. One way of obtaining the materials is to steal them from weak governments. There are about 40 countries with the ability to make fissile material. It has been estimated that at least 130 000 nuclear weapons could be produced using existing material. And there are countries that

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<sup>50</sup> Bunn, Matthew and Wier Anthony, *The Seven Myths of Nuclear Terrorism*, Current History (April 2005)

<sup>51</sup> Keller, Bill, *Nuclear Nightmares*. (New York Times Magazine, 26 May 2002).

<sup>52</sup> F.ex. see Cirincione, Joseph, *Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons*. (New York 2007). ” I agree with my opponent that the biggest threat facing the country is weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorist network”. President George W. Bush after Senator John Kerry in 2004 Presidential Campaign.

produce plutonium.<sup>53</sup> Nuclear weapons could be made in ten years but it would take less than a year if terrorists have the material.<sup>54</sup> And all the countries that have civilian nuclear reactors have enough plutonium to use for making nuclear weapons, if needed. It has been estimated that there are more than 20 000 nuclear weapons in the world at the moment.<sup>55</sup>

The challenge in preventing nuclear attacks is in securing weapon stockpiles. Russia has the biggest nuclear weapon stockpiles that include highly enriched uranium (HEU). Russia as the most likely source for nuclear terrorists has been studied in chapter 2.

A BC attack by terrorists is one of the least known threats. Bioterrorism is understood to be an especially unique threat because the response to a bioterrorism attack would require careful coordination among sectors that are not traditionally prepared for counterterrorism. The 2001 worldwide anthrax mailings alerted the public and their governments to the threat of terrorists using biological weapons. There are claims that al Qaeda has biological weapons, including anthrax and chemical weapons, such as nerve gas.<sup>56</sup>

The necessary means against bioterrorism include: the research of countermeasures, preparations in public health infrastructure, and greater readiness of first responders. And there is a need for a system which monitors the environment for presence of air contaminants, and which could provide early detection and possible treatment. The presence of monitoring sensors may serve as an effective deterrent to potential bioterrorists, but the concept is limited: sensors within a huge urbanized area only monitor a limited distance.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> [http://www.nti.org/e\\_research/cnwm/threat/global.asp](http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/threat/global.asp)

<sup>54</sup> Allison, Graham, *Nuclear Terrorism, The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*. (New York 2005). pp 223-224. 2005. and <http://www.nuclearterror.org/faq.html> and <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/>

<sup>55</sup> <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab19.asp>. Sizes like the smallest American “Davy Crockett” 0.1 kiloton and the biggest Russian “Tsar Bomba” 100 megaton (6500 size of Nagasaki and Hiroshima)

<sup>56</sup> Crumpton, Henry A, U.S. Coordinator for Counterterrorism. *Briefing after Bioterrorism International Coordination Exercise*, (Washington D.C. January 17, 2007) and *Country Reports on Terrorism*. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. U.S. Department of State, (April 30, 2007)

<sup>57</sup> <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror.html>. Program used in U.S. is called BioWatch. In 2007 BioWatch was used in 30 U.S. cities.

## Geographical Perspective

### Terrorism is Traditional in Russia

Terrorism is a typical socio-political phenomenon and part of the mentality in Russia. They have a tradition of well-organized and massive terrorism since the Bolshevistic terror in the 1930s. Nowadays, there are 20 Million Muslims living in Russia, and some use terror for political purposes. For some Russian ethnic groups, especially in the Caucasus, terror is enmeshed in the fabric of their culture and religion.<sup>58</sup>

A distinctive element of the concept of modern terrorism is imported from neighboring countries. So far, terrorism in Russia has been internal and homegrown. Terror attacks have been done by a wide variety of organizations. The reason is a need to have revenge, rather than being recognized; organizations seldom declare responsibility for attacks, as terrorists normally do. Russia is in danger of becoming a target of international terrorism and it's clear that Russia supports the global war against terror mainly because of the military operation against rebel and terrorist factions in Chechnya.

### Terrorism is Continuous in Europe

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Europe. Thousands of Europeans have been killed in terrorist attacks since the beginning of the 1970s<sup>59</sup>. European countries were not fully prepared for migrants. The biggest social and security problem in Europe will be Islamic extremism. Organized crime, the first step to terrorism, is also increasing in pockets of the European Muslim communities. For example, about 60 percent of jailed prisoners in France

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<sup>58</sup> [www.nasledie.ru/terror/](http://www.nasledie.ru/terror/)

<sup>59</sup> As a few examples: Terrorist attack against Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics, Madrid train attacks on 11 March 2004, the London attacks of 7 July 2004 or all the IRA and ETA attacks during last decades.

are Muslim; but only eight percent of the French population is Muslim.<sup>60</sup> These statistics suggest that many Muslims in France are engaging in illicit activities.

There are almost 20 million Muslim immigrants living in Europe. Some of these newcomers are marginalized – reluctant to adapt to, or accept, the society in which they now live: young, frustrated, disappointed Muslims are ideal candidates for terrorist groups. Terrorists use European passports for operational traveling. The next wave of terrorists will be homegrown by the nations in which they live, supported by terrorist veterans from the Middle East.<sup>61</sup>

In the case of terrorism in Europe, the threat is more national than regional. Perceptions are different among countries, but also between the United States and Europe. Although many Muslims are relative newcomers to the United States, they are highly assimilated in American society. U.S. Muslim immigrants have a higher status than European Muslim immigrants. Muslim immigrants established their existence in Europe in 1970 and the mid 90's. Many European countries (especially Britain, Holland, Germany, and Sweden) welcomed political refugees in the 1980's. Many of them were Islamic fundamentalists and Afghan war veterans. Some countries like France, Spain, and Italy were more prepared to accept the same refugees than were, for example, the Netherlands and Germany.

The second phase of the rise of terrorism in Europe, the self-evaluation of the terrorist network, started in 1995. Terrorists continued their work for the dream of a global Islamic state. Europe, along with al Qaeda Afghan training camps, was the region where Bin Laden's idea of global *jihad* actualized.<sup>62</sup> Islamist groups worked for al Qaeda's strategy of attacking the United States and its allies. After 9/11, homegrown terrorism has been increasing.

All major Islamist terrorist attacks after 9/11 have occurred outside the United States. The first large and deadly terrorist strike on European soil took place in Madrid on March 11, 2004. It

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<sup>60</sup> <http://www.logosmedia.fi/uutisarkisto/ranskapaasivu.html>

<sup>61</sup> Vidino, Lorenzo, *Islamic Extremism in Europe*. (Testimony before Congress, April 27, 2005) It has been predicted that from Iraq Europe will have hundreds skillful and experienced terrorists in near future. Vidino is an analyst in Jebson Center for Counterterrorism Studies at Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and the Investigative Project on Terrorism in Washington, DC.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

was not as a surprise; the imminent threat existed. Major strikes have taken place in London, Madrid, Paris, Porto, Milan, Berlin, Bali, Oman, and Amsterdam. The lack of acceptable immigration policies is cited as one of the reasons for the growth of Islamic radicalism.

The real danger in the near future is that foreign fighters in Iraq may return to their own countries in the Arab world and Europe. These experienced and battle-hardened terrorists could carry out attacks there. In particular, strategic suicide attacks are predicted to increase. Al Qaeda is more decentralized than before and has many subunits directing operations in Europe.

Vulnerable Scandinavia is no longer immune from Muslim or homegrown terrorism attacks. Through an Internet based network, homegrown individuals and groups represent the imminent threat. These individuals are young second- and third-generation immigrants. As mentioned earlier, the number of converts is growing and some veterans from the Middle East and North Africa. It is not likely that these are ideologically affiliated with al Qaeda, rather they are autonomous groups<sup>63</sup> which could accomplish any huge operation. Although they have simple organizations and weak preparations, they have to be considered as a serious threat.<sup>64</sup>

## New Directions in the Terrorist Movement: from Latin America and Africa to Europe and the United States

Terrorist movements take place all over the world. The Middle and Far East are areas where lines of terrorism are traditionally known. New operational directions are Africa and

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<sup>63</sup> Autonomous Groups are not widely coordinated or organized. Threat, that these autonomous cells are creating, are normally numerous episodes of low- level activity, such as vandalism, but some significant events like terrorist attacks are possible. As an example are all kinds of Animal Liberation Organizations.

<sup>64</sup> Vidino, Lorenzo, *The Dangers of Homegrown Terrorism to Scandinavia*. (TerrorismMonitor vol IV, issue 20 October 19, 2006).

Latin America. Particularly, illegal trafficking, financing, and recruiting to Europe from Latin America and Africa are growing significantly.

Latin American countries have struggled mainly with domestic terrorism. Sometimes, international terrorist groups have also advanced their causes. As an example, there are modern terrorist threats in Colombia, Peru, and the tri-border area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. Many Muslims live in the TBA. There are 500,000 Muslims in Latin America. Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas have developed sophisticated financial structures in the region, but investigations have concluded that so far there are no known operational cells of Islamic terrorists in the area. Cuba, however, is said to be sponsoring terrorism by offering safe haven for fugitives. Meanwhile, Venezuela is not cooperating on antiterrorism issues.<sup>65</sup>

The first internationally linked terrorist bombings took place in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Hezbollah launched the first bombing of the Israeli Embassy that killed 30 people in 1992, as well as the second bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) in 1994, which killed 85 people. The biggest challenge will be to work against the proliferation of Islamist terrorist organizations in the region.<sup>66</sup> Even though these incidents often take place on the other side of hemisphere, most of them are unfortunately linked closely to our society. The latest Latin American terrorist incident took place at New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport in June, 2007 when three men conspired to blow up a main fuel line.

## **Means and Measures against Terrorists**

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<sup>65</sup> CRS Report RL32251, *Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List*, CRS Report RL32730, *Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress* and CRS Report RL32488, *Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy*.

<sup>66</sup> Testimony of Gen. James T. Hill, United States Army, Commander, United States Southern Command, before the House Armed Services Committee, (March 24, 2004) and Posture statement of Gen. Brantz J. Craddock, U.S. Army Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 109th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, (March 15, 2005).



Eliminating grievances or feelings of humiliation is challenging, as is countering terrorism. Reducing confidence in terrorists' ability to carry out attacks is vital, but it would be more effective to have an influence upon the root causes of terrorism. Offensive military actions and concessions alone are not effective countermeasures. Dialogue is always necessary, but negotiators have to be cautious about concessions, which allow only short term relief.<sup>67</sup> Even if some countries do not negotiate with terrorists at all, communications are needed, and it is advised that demands such as ransom are not met. Italy's March, 2007 negotiation for the release of Taliban militants in exchange for the freedom of an Italian hostage in Afghanistan was widely criticized. In the long term, the consequences of concessions – such as freeing prisoners or paying ransom under pressure – are usually counterproductive.<sup>68</sup> The message we send to terrorist organizations is long lasting, and increases their confidence. At the same time, it partly legitimizes their actions. When a policy is agreed upon and cooperation started with one organization, new terrorist organizations will begin to operate in a similar manner.

There are many hard and detailed means to be employed in the fight against terrorists. And too often they are used without an understanding of the consequences. Often they are used because governments like to show their effectiveness in reacting to threats. But this again helps the terrorists achieve one goal: to be known. Governments should not use terrorism as a political trick to engender fear. Using terrorists or fighting only by military means gives

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<sup>67</sup> Concessions or not. As a example: In 2005 Algerian President Bouteflicka freed 2200 prisoners and made other concessions with Islamic fighters (the Armed Islamic Group). Now suicide attacks are increasing again among other terrorist organizations (like al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb). (Algeria is one of the richest Arab states with poorest people; political unjust and elite corruption is among the causes of terrorism. There has been the bloodiest terrorist war in contemporary Muslim history. A campaign has claimed the lives of at least 40 000 people since 1991. Terrorist groups operating in Europe, U.S., Iraq and Afghanistan have long maintained bases in Algeria and used the country as a source of recruits. Additionally there are dozens of Algerians among alleged terrorists captured by the United States and its allies in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001.

See Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism Centre, <http://jiaa.janes.com/public/jiaa/africa.shtml>

<sup>68</sup> Some examples: in Afghanistan in March 2007 Italy's Prime Minister Prodis government pressured the Kabul Government to free five Taliban prisoners in exchange for reporter Daniele Mastrogiacono. Some weeks later two French aid workers were kidnapped along with three Afghan colleagues in same area as before. It has been argued that in Iraq Italy's Prime Minister Berlusconi's government paid ransoms to free Italian hostages in Iraq.

terrorists the opportunity to achieve their main aims. They need to have publicity. Terrorists like to have approval to react and perform acts of revenge.

Some countries have declared a war against terror, partly as a reaction to Osama bin Laden's declaration of war in 1998. This is another intangible that terrorists seek: a corresponding reaction. Some terrorist analysts argue that it makes no more sense to declare war on the tactic of terrorism than it does to declare war on any other tactic. Critics argue that the War on Terror is "a colossal mistake."<sup>69</sup> However, most reports and studies recommended starting the war immediately after 9/11.<sup>70</sup> According to Joseph S. Nye Jr., the United States was correct in changing its national security strategy to focus on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction after 9/11. He only criticizes the military means that the United States is using apart from its soft power. On the contrary, terrorists are using their soft power abilities against their enemies. Nye even argues that through soft power, terrorists gain general support as well as new recruits.<sup>71</sup> And this seems to make it easier to fulfill the third demand that terrorists are looking for: to have revenge.

In *The Clash of Civilizations*, Samuel Huntington, professor of government at Harvard University, argues that the only way to survive is to learn to live with other civilizations. Tolerance is the way to proceed if we aspire to harmony among societies. But more peaceful and unified world is not achieved by adjusting to terrorism as we do to traffic accidents or diseases. States should work hard against terrorism in the same way that they work against accidents and diseases, namely by enhancing traffic security and creating countermeasures against pandemics. Governments need to improve their counterterrorism capabilities, through, for example, reliable immigration policies and stronger border security. Corruption, weak government institutions, ineffective interagency cooperation, and weak legislation make

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<sup>69</sup> Richardson, Louise, *What Terrorists Want*. (New York, Random House 2006); Pape, Robert A., *Dying to Win: Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. (New York, Random House 2005), Stern, Jessica *Terror in the name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*. (New York, Harpercollins 2003).

<sup>70</sup> See for example *The 9/11 Commission Report*. Official Government Report, (U.S. Government Printing Office, July 26, 2004) or *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001*, United States Department of State (May 2002).

<sup>71</sup> Nye Jr, Joseph S., *Soft Power*. (New York, Perseus Book Group 2004. p. 25

it easier for terrorists to operate. Training and cooperation between the public and private sectors is essential in order for both spheres to be protected against terrorist threats.

First of all, every government needs to monitor potential terrorist threats in its region. This requires an increase in bilateral and regional cooperation. Cooperation on antiterrorism should take place between countries, including joint efforts by governmental and non-governmental organizations. The assistance of weak countries should include anti-terrorism training and funding. Means that are of special importance are:

- counterterrorism expertise and intelligence
- airport and harbor security management
- hostage negotiations
- bomb detection and deactivation
- countering terrorism financing.

Economic sanctions like prohibitions on the sale or license of defence articles and services have also been used.<sup>72</sup>

There are counterterrorism weapons and devices that are used mainly for defensive purposes. These often costly means are unfortunately ineffective because of their wide distribution and large areas of operation. For example, there are detection machines designed to sniff out nuclear bombs, as well as machines that screen cargo to detect radiation. They are able to find a nuclear device or a radioactive dirty bomb. New detectors aim to prevent nuclear terror – New York City has been a test site. Later in the year 2007, an elaborate network of radiation alarms at some bridges, tunnels, roadways, and waterways will be set up in a 50 mile radius around New York City. If testing is successful, this will be a major shift of focus for the U. S. Department of Homeland Security. Certain areas may be covered, controlled and even secured, but there are some disadvantages too. The installation of radiation scanners at the nation's ports and land border crossings is predicted to be the first generation of nuclear terrorism defence, but this is an expensive method of disrupting terrorist

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<sup>72</sup> Sullivan, Mark P., Specialist in Latin American Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade Division. *Latin America: Terrorism Issues*. (Updated January 22, 2007) and *Country Reports on Terrorism*. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. U.S. Department of State, (April 30, 2007) Especially U.S. against Cuba and Venezuela.

activities. This extreme self-defence preparation not only places a responsibility on all cities for improving counterterrorism systems, but also their counter reaction strategies and false alarm detection systems. As an example, two men working for an innocuous marketing campaign created a panic by installing 38 electronic light board advertisements which caused a day long bomb scare in the Boston area in the spring of 2007.

Terrorists operate through networks. This is one of the biggest reasons why lines of communications are well secured. Functional networks are vital for terrorists. They need to have a physical base from which to operate, but individuals are often unorganized; for instance, they do not have organizational charts. Thus, intelligence gathering and analyzing individual terrorist acts is demanding. But terrorists have relationships and social lives that can be mapped and studied. The rise of terrorists groups and their use of available technology enable precise ways for understanding their aims and motivations. Mapping the web of relationships among terrorist groups, arms scientists, and possible suppliers can assist in finding out their possible interests and goals, such as obtaining weapons of mass destruction.<sup>73</sup>

Nations should maintain lists of terrorists and terrorism suspects. Parts of the list should be distributed to authorities involved in controlling and securing citizens. For example, the EU has a list containing the names of 60 organizations or individuals. The United States created a system called Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) because of the failure to deliver the information held by various agencies about al Qaeda before 9/11. Such a database is publicly criticized because of its lack of respect for individual privacy, secrecy, and vulnerability.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Interview of Robert Kehlet, Coordinator of research for the Defence Threat Reduction Agency, Boston Globe. (March 28, 2007). “We’d like to know how these networks form, how decisions are made...” In U.S. addition to the conventional intelligence the Defence Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) started three-year research project to study the dynamics of the network that leads to nuclear terrorism”. See also *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Central Intelligence Agency. (February 2003)

<sup>74</sup> See *9/11 Report* or website National Counterterrorism Center (NCC)

Global and governmental efforts to prevent nuclear materials from getting into the hands of terrorists should be at the top of the daily political agenda. In *Nuclear Terrorism: the Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*, Graham Allison of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government presents a global doctrine of Three No's that is a highly recommended way of thinking about international policy. The idea of the "No Loose Nukes, No New Nascent Nukes and No New Nuclear Weapons States" is idealistic but argued as only a solution. The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammed ElBaradei, outlined seven steps to nuclear security in a way that is more detailed, but which aims at the same result as Allison's proposal. These ideas of controlling nuclear security problems should also be part of daily politics.<sup>75</sup>

There have been political achievements in these policies. The UN response – especially that advocated by the United States, China, and Russia, concerning North Korea's attempts to develop nuclear weapon production lines seems to be effective. But Great Britain's decision on 15 March 2007 to modernize the nuclear arsenal was not a step toward a more secure nuclear world. This decision increases the number of nuclear weapons and resists both Allison's and ElBaradei's ideas.

## How to End Terrorist Groups

Some terrorist groups have lasted generations. Given the nature of the threat posed by al Qaeda and the global jihad networks it has spawned, it is highly unlikely that these

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<sup>75</sup> ElBaradei, Mohammed, *Seven Steps to Raise World Security*. (Financial Times, 2 February 2005).

- moratorium on building new capacity for uranium enrichment and plutonium separation
- conversion of HEU reactors to use low-enriched uranium
- establishing "the additional protocol" as an international norm
- decisive actions by UN Security Council in the case of withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty
- invoking Security Council Resolution 1540 to pursue and prosecute any illicit nuclear trading
- accelerated implementation on the part of the five nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT of their "unequivocal commitment" nuclear disarmament
- the necessity of resolving existing security problems worldwide that influence states' decisions about whether to seek nuclear weapons.

organizations will disappear in the near future. Nevertheless, there are some optimistic arguments that adduce the demise of terrorism, or at least the decline of terrorist groups.


All the major origins for the earlier endings have been studied while looking for the end of al Qaeda. Those reasons and detailed examples are as follows:

- (1) Eliminating the terrorist leader ended the threats of the Shining Path in Peru, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and Aum Shinrikyo in Japan.
- (2) Unsuccessful generational transition is estimated to be the possible end of al Qaeda's ability to act as an organization. The European Red Brigades and the Baader-Meinhof were groups that became ideologically bankrupt, leaving no change to transition to a next generation.
- (3) Some organizations cease to exist once they have achieved their original objective. The African National Congress (ANC) launched its last terrorist attack in 1989 after having fulfilled its objective of ending the apartheid regime.
- (4) Some groups have focused on political means. For example, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) transitioned to political legitimacy and away from terrorist actions after the opening of negotiations and the peace process with Israel.
- (5) In some cases, terrorist groups have lost their popularity, or
- (6) they have been unable to operate indefinitely without support. The loss of active and passive support for Chechen terrorist groups is the latest example
- (7) The use of armed forces has accelerated or ended a number of groups. Unfortunately, like in Chechen, it may prove to be counterproductive, or might bring the problem elsewhere.
- (8) Sometimes terrorist groups change their methods of operation. The use of terrorist means is converted to either criminality or traditional conventional warfare.<sup>76</sup> Even if bin Laden's charismatic leadership ends and generational transition does not succeed, al Qaeda has already spread its ideology of lasting terrorism to other organizations and individuals.

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<sup>76</sup> Cronin, Audrey Kurth. "How al Qaeda Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups." *International Security* 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006)

Figure 2: Eight Ways to Finish Terrorist Organization



### Fighting Internationally Against Terrorism

Prior to the events of September 11, terrorism was considered a matter primarily for state authorities responsible for internal security: border control and the police. Now, the modern, comprehensive approach includes almost all possible means in the fight against terrorism. The international community should only use military force as a last resort, and the

use of this force must be in accordance with the UN charter. In the fight against terrorism, there is always the danger of violating human rights while actually seeking to preserve them.

We cannot find a solution to terrorism by cooperating in military unions only. For example, the advantage of the non-military European Union is that, due its structure, it covers a broad scope of its members' societies and needs. The EU has all the means for providing increasingly more multi-national facilities and cooperation. There is no primary need to create a strong military power as a first basis but extensive international cooperation including a wide range of bilateral contacts, especially in the United States, Russia, and the Islamic world.

There are many concrete achievements in combating terrorism already: flight security and the protection of the other critical infrastructure have been improved. These results are sometimes time-consuming, but vital; they focus mainly on the consequences of terrorism. The main challenge is to find common approaches toward the fight against terrorism. The solution is to deal with its roots and reasons. As an example, in the United States there are 2.35 million Muslim Americans that are largely assimilated, happy with their lives and adaptive to core American values. A study by the Pew Research Center in May 2007 shows that the majority of the Muslim community has blended comfortably into American life. The study reveals that only 13 percent of Muslim Americans think that the suicide bombings of civilian targets to defend Islam can be justified. The results of this survey show a far lower percentage in that regard than similar studies among Muslims in many other nations, including in European countries.<sup>77</sup>

Europe needs to create a European Islam. Islam should be seriously taken as a part of societies. And we have to have a permanent field presence in every place that causes terrorism; the logical way to do this is through the UN, the EU, or the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe).

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<sup>77</sup> Pew Research Center Study, *Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream*, (May 2007). <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=329>. Study shows that American Muslims are moderate, and middle class. They believe that hard work will lead to success. And their income and educational levels are comparable with most Americans.



The U.S. war on terror is not the central argument of this paper, but it has been a major issue in international affairs, and therefore the relevant recommendations are presented in annex 1.

## The Role of Illegal Immigration and Border Control

Fighting terrorism is one major part of the overall fight against organized crime, and illegal immigration has become a focus point due to the nature of border management. Effective responses lie with the systematic implementation of border security systems, and with the fluent and confidential cooperation of internal and foreign authorities. First, the security system has to cover third world countries mainly by intelligence and consular matters; second, cooperation with the border security between neighboring countries has to be fluent; third, surveillance and checking at the borders need to be based on tailor-made strategic, operational and tactical risk analyses; and the fourth important filter in the fight against terrorism concerns an immigration control that is normally operated by police, customs, and frontier guard organizations. This includes joint crime intelligence and investigations procedures.<sup>78</sup> In some parts of all these efforts, the military already has a role. But the depth of assistance should be studied carefully in the future.

The question of action against the recruiting and financing of terrorism is a decisive part in the effort in anti- and counterterrorism. Some funds are frozen, but all relevant funds and money transfers cannot be controlled by the involved authorities because of the complexity of the international financing system.

## The Role of Police and the State's Rescue System

In Finland, it is mainly the responsibility of the police to counter terrorism. Under the Act on the Provision of Assistance by the Defence Forces to the Police, military assistance is provided for certain tasks when no use of force is needed. Additionally, the police should be

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<sup>78</sup> See for example [http://www.frontex.europa.eu/origin\\_and\\_tasks/tasks/](http://www.frontex.europa.eu/origin_and_tasks/tasks/)

entitled to military support from the Defence Forces, entailing the use of force stronger than the use of personal weapons, in situations combating terrorism.

New threats – especially possible terrorist attacks – bring rescue services and other public authorities under a new kind of pressure. Precautions should always be taken against another possible explosion (the so-called “plus one” principle<sup>79</sup>). This has an impact on safety distances, the scale of necessary evacuations, and the decentralization of equipment and personnel. Although governmental rescue services are a multi-skilled organizations, they increasingly needs Defence Forces assistance, not only for providing compulsory military service for rescue personnel but for securing, evacuating, and protecting against possible CBRN threats.

Risk analyses have a preventive role in the event of serious acts of sabotage and terrorism. One example of such a situation is a terrorist attack on underground traffic. The analyses highlight the importance of surveillance cameras in public places. Especially for suicide terrorists who crave publicity, cameras have a controversial effect – although sometimes the impact can be contrary to expectations.

## Leadership, Management and the Role of Intelligence

Anti-terrorist measures have to be created in every country. All the European anti-terrorism organizations should have the ability to monitor and control imminent threats. Legislation has to be updated, though some consequences would be against individuals.

No country can deal with terrorism alone. Formulating effective counterterrorism measures will be a long process combining political, economic, diplomatic, and military efforts. We still

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<sup>79</sup> “plus one” principle is a way of thinking. It means that after an explosion there is always probability to have additional explosions.

need to emphasize the role of the United Nations in global security, which includes counterterrorist campaigns. Only the United Nations can legitimately intervene in the breeding grounds of terrorism early and effectively enough.

Various modern threats, especially terrorism, have led to active measures in government administrations. A new concept for safeguarding the vital functions of society has been prepared jointly by state ministries. Even though each sector has assessed its own strategic tasks and standards, all major incidents have to be organized and led by the highest level – quite often by the Prime Minister’s office. It is crucial that political leadership is informed early and accurately. Organizations must have a functional structure to manage crises and to be prepared to make prompt decisions in every situation.

Intelligence informs and enables multi-agency responses to a threat; the exchange of information and the cooperation in the field of police, military, and intelligence is already enhanced. The cooperation between the military and the police also needs to be strengthened in Finland – not only in the level of intelligence. It seems that future tasks of the organizations will be similar to each other.<sup>80</sup>

Bilateral intelligence relationships are crucial. Most intelligence exchanges of value take place bilaterally because they are more secure. Multinational intelligence sharing is advisable but may not always be practical. There are also some intelligence conspiracies that link international interests. It is widely argued that much of the intelligence handed over by states for dissemination through multinational organizations (especially NATO) is usually sanitized. Trade in intelligence is based on trust between partners. And trust takes time to build.

Indeed, most challenges for military action against terrorism are in the field. Preventative action is quite often similar to the routine work of civilian authorities. It may include the use of force to support intelligence to prevent terrorism. In some cases there is a need for military assistance. Support through Special Forces is common, but not habitual. On land, the

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<sup>80</sup> As during the 30 years of terrorism in Northern Ireland, military actions were classified as Military Aid to the Civil Power. Military cooperated effectively with civilian authorities.

cooperation among countries and authorities is improving but in the air, surveillance seems to be an unsolvable dilemma. If the threat is a hijacked airplane targeting a vital national symbol, who gives the mandate to shoot it down?

## 4. The Revised Role of Armed Forces

### **Security before Defence**

One of the conclusions is that every country needs to take care of its own security in the future – at least of its defense security. Global threats are of great interest to security organizations like NATO and the UN; meanwhile, the responsibility to defend a country lies within that country itself. The EU should only strengthen its existing security abilities. One recommended way of deepening EU military capabilities is to take Member States or NATO forces under the EU command and UN mandate.

As a central argument of this study, it seems that the contemporary threats – and especially analysis for the future – drive armed forces to correct their role in security structure. Armed forces should focus more on tasks that are often the main responsibility of other security authorities. There are different historical, political, and cultural views about the use of military forces for domestic emergencies. The role of armed forces – like the threat – varies in different countries. For example, in France, the military forces assist in emergency disaster response. As a reaction after the London bomb attacks in 2005, French Military Forces guarded ports, airports, public buildings, and train stations. They also provide transportation to other authorities, assist during labor strikes, and respond to oil spills. Meanwhile, the Canadian Forces (CF) provides humanitarian support. The CF has assisted police forces by

guarding prisoners and controlling riots.<sup>81</sup> Finally, the National Guard in the United States is responsible for assisting in domestic emergencies, in addition to serving as auxiliary to the overseas armed forces.

Today, Finland is prepared to cope with unexpected threats, but for the future we need to cooperate with other authorities that are responsible for security issues. There are ten major tasks for the Defence Forces. Naturally, they all focus on military defense and the only exceptional task has a clause to take part in rescue operations if it does not harm the national defense tasks of the Defence Forces.<sup>82</sup> As a part of National Security, military defence has to concentrate upon increasing its focus on modern threats, and on operations other than war.

As an example, the Armed Forces of Finland have little knowledge and readiness to react to and to assist in counterterrorist operations. They are more prepared to provide support in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. In traditional measures like transportation, evacuation and isolation, their military capabilities might be helpful, but are not preventive.

How do new asymmetric threats (especially the threat of strategic terror) affect the concept of total defence? The concept itself remains far-reaching and the correct way of thinking. Some parts of the defence strategy have to be redefined and focused. The role of the armed forces has to be more flexible. The military way of thinking about protecting its own forces should also be extended to protecting civilians. *There is no need to abolish conscription as a national service, but participation and structure should be revised according to all security needs.*

These real threats, some of them very potential, fall under the gray area between military and civilian sectors. Fighting modern threats effectively requires well functioning cooperation

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<sup>81</sup> Jane's Defense Weekly, *Who Will You Call?* (17 May 2006). Already in 1971 and 1976 CF personnel dealt with prison riots and in 1975 the substituted as federal prison guards during strike.

<sup>82</sup> To take part in rescue operations by making available the equipment, personnel, resources and expert services required in rescue operations if it is considered necessary because of the scope or special nature of the accident; participation in rescue operations should not jeopardize the national defence tasks of the Defence Forces. See *Annual Exchange of Information on Defence Planning 2006*, Defence Staff International Division in Finland, (Valid as of 21 March 2006) or [http://www.mil.fi/perustietoa/julkaisut/defence\\_planning\\_2006\\_finland.pdf](http://www.mil.fi/perustietoa/julkaisut/defence_planning_2006_finland.pdf)

structures between all respective authorities. Areas of responsibilities are not as clearly defined as they used to be. In Finland, this presents new challenges for the Finnish Police, the Rescue Service, the Frontier Guard, and the Defence Forces. Joint command, control and communications network, including both civilian and military authorities, already exists. Some private enterprises and non-governmental organizations should be taken in to the C3 structure – connected in to their own branch of governmental administration.

Due to the character of wide-ranging security threats, pre-agreed collaboration agreements and preparedness plans have to be flexible. At the same time, we receive data from hundreds of measuring stations through a combined civilian-military radiation surveillance network; we train personnel in replying to threat calls, or for handling mail that may be contaminated. The military should share its expertise, especially in organizing joint training and exercises, should exchange intelligence information, support other organizations by special skills, use military research institutions, and provide personnel and equipment. Search and rescue operations, evacuation, and protecting civilians in crisis areas are tasks which armed forces should be prepared for, increasingly, in the future.

As mentioned earlier, the government under the command of the Prime Minister's Office provides guidance and information through security policies. The government follows the development of the international situation and coordinates preventive and protective measures against asymmetric threats, and the government reacts if there is a need to amend national legislation or to change the powers of authorities. In addition, there are acts for exceptional circumstances. For example, under the Emergency Powers Act, the authorities are also under the obligation to be prepared for asymmetric threats. Unfortunately, this governmental approach does not allow non-governmental organizations, private enterprises or individuals to operate as preventive actors. Even if it appears to be complicated, these parties should be considered partners.

## **Other Challenges for the Future Defence Forces**

As has been widely predicted, the defence forces will need to contend in its future dealing and financing with:

- A growing pension burden
- A shrinking recruitment pool
- Societies increasingly cautious about interventions
- A growing need to secure citizens against large-scale new and unknown threats<sup>83</sup>

Also from this perspective, the military increasingly needs to enhance its cooperative capabilities to support other security institutions and society. At the same time, armed forces are met with general approval and are afforded the legitimization to develop their abilities.

The most important tools in fighting against terrorism are intelligence, exchange of information, joint threat assessment, and contingency planning. That demands a framework for domestic and international cooperation. Police/Customs/Frontier Guard cooperation is an exemplary model of joint work. All we need to do is introduce a military element. The Defence Forces need to be one of a multiple range of instruments to be used against terrorism.

The revised role of defence forces will be more politically influenced. In the future, operations in missions will be controlled by tight rules of engagement; victory will be understood as a successful accomplishment of mission. And the media will scrutinize all operations. Interoperability is vital, and the use of shared or pooled capabilities is necessary in, for example, air-lifting, communication, and monitoring technologies.

The growing need for high technology creates a challenge for future defence forces. While a former tendency toward large force structures is diminishing, the importance of individual soldiers will not disappear. All the statistics show that today's soldiers are busier now than they have been for 60 years.<sup>84</sup> Individual soldiers still perform the most vital role on the

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83 See for example Rosen, Stephen Peter, *The Future of War and the American Military*. Harvard Magazine (May-June 2002), *An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs*, European Defense Agency.(3 October 2006.) and <http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/>

84 *Year in Review 2006, United Nations Peace Operations, New Challenges, New Horizons*. United Nations (Department of Public Information 2007).

battlefield. War fighting is fundamentally a human activity, and as Fredrick W. Kagan argues: “attempts to remove humans from its center – as recent trends and current programs do – are likely to lead to disaster.”<sup>85</sup> The threat and an enemy should be known and studied thoroughly. In addition to your opponents’ tactics you need to learn their aims, values, and hopefully, their way of thinking.

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85 Kagan, Fredrick W, *The U.S. Military's Manpower Crisis*. Foreign Affairs, (July/August 2006)



## What Should the U.S. Do in the War on Terrorism?

If the U.S. occupation of Iraq and a war against terrorists are understood as two different matters, as they mainly do in Afghanistan, the concept would be easier to realize. The U.S. presence in Iraq helps al Qaeda move bin Laden's plan forward. Al Qaeda is concerned about the Sunni minority's future in a Shiite majority country if the coalition exits Iraq. In addition, there are more reasons why al Qaeda would want to keep the coalition in Iraq. Bin Laden's main goal is to draw the United States into wars throughout the Islamic world. In the long term, al Qaeda and its affiliates are trying to weaken the United States and allow al Qaeda to focus on destroying its "near enemies."<sup>86</sup>

The decision to declare a war against terrorists has been made and it seems irreversible. Declaring the war was a quick reaction because terrorists already declared war against the West in 1998, and because of the tragedy of September 11. It seems that there is no way out of this war until peaceful solution has been achieved. Many experts argue that war on terror can never be won – at least, not by military means.<sup>87</sup>

First of all, the United States needs to strengthen cooperation among other countries, on both political and military levels. The need to widen cooperation between civilian branches and international organizations – especially with NGOs – is imminent. As Nye argues, the United States is using the wrong methods, even though its overall strategy is correct.

From the beginning, the United States neglected to involve other countries in its war against terror – even the countries from its coalition. There is a constant and increasing need to mobilize the international community behind a transnational campaign against transnational

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<sup>86</sup> Riedel, Bruce, *Al Qaeda Strikes Back*. Foreign Affairs (May/June 2007) and *Country Reports on Terrorism*. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. U.S. Department of State. (April 30, 2007)

<sup>87</sup> Richardson, Louise, *What Terrorists Want*. (New York, Random House 2006), Stern, Jessica, *Terror in the name of God: Why Religious Militants kill*. (New York, Harpercollins 2003).

terrorists. It is necessary to cooperate with allies, to exploit their resources, and to gain support from other countries and organizations. One solution would be to establish effective multilateral organizations designed to eliminate terrorists. This system should have widely acceptable norms and procedures so that the sharing of information becomes systematic. The knowledge of other countries more experienced with terrorism, for example, Spain or Ireland, demonstrates the effectiveness of such collaborative arrangements. One important channel is the EU, which can provide both political and operational assistance in tracking and capturing militants, reducing their funding, and slowing down their operations. Strategically, international cooperation improves the legitimacy of the United States reputation and position. The United States should recognize that some other countries have more extensive experience in postwar reconstruction; many are already actively engaged in such in Afghanistan.

Secondly, if the United States is using strong military force, it should affect the enemy's center of gravity. The terrorists' center of gravity is the spread of Islamic militancy. Of course, stopping this spread is a challenging and long-term objective, but this way of thinking already exists in the minds of most leaders and even soldiers. In principle, at least, this has been a vital part of military training for a long time and is written in many U.S. Field Manuals. Some argue that the main focus of Washington's new strategy should be to target al Qaeda's leaders.<sup>88</sup> There is no major misunderstanding between these arguments because leaders are the ones providing inspiration and direction for global Islamic militancy. Unlike the goal of eliminating terrorism, the goal of containing the threat of terrorism is realistic.

In the long term, the enemy should be studied and defined carefully. Killing one terrorist produces two new ones – this is an agreed upon fact. For example, the United States can only imagine how many young men were recruited to terrorist groups out of hatred, not respect, for the Geneva Convention rules in recent years. Another realized truth is that Islamic values differ from Western values. The countries of the western hemisphere should agree to and respect those dissimilarities. The need for ongoing dialogue with enemies and their

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<sup>88</sup> Riedel, Bruce, *Al Qaeda Strikes Back*. Foreign Affairs (May/June 2007)

communities should take place not only at the ground level – as it normally does – but on all levels of communication.

The war against terrorism is important because it aims to isolate the enemy from its respective community. There is a need to create strong communities that are able to operate and to isolate terrorists. The United States, as the dominant member of the anti-terrorism coalition, is trying to bring civilized democratic principles to the countries in which they are operating. But Western values cannot be assimilated without mutual tolerance and understanding.<sup>89</sup>

According to the incumbent President of the United States (POTUS), US troops overseas operate efficiently and in a professional manner. The President, as the Supreme Commander of the Defence Forces, fully trusts and supports the troops. The President gives tasks and increases resources to his commanders. Strengthening of forces in the war against terror takes place, even though a number of detractors are vocally against it. US troops are clearing the enemy abroad aiming that the enemy doesn't enter the U.S. soil. The administration is apparently prepared for the campaigns abroad to last a long time, but it is slowly coming to realize that the war will not be resolved only by military means. Defeating the insurgency depends more on how well the reconstruction mission and the international aid mission is focused. Patience in time and in other demands is needed. The president and the White House probably possess enough patience, but other authorities, institutions and American citizens most probably do not.

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<sup>89</sup> *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Central Intelligence Agency. (February 2003)

## Figures

**Figure 1: Preparation of Threats in the United States**

**Figure 2: Eight Ways to Finish Terrorist Organization**

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